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European automobile industry Background and objectives 
J.  In October  1980  the  Commiuion sent  to 
the  European  Parliament,  the  Offices  of the 
Permanent Representatives, the Economic and 
Social  Committee,  the  trade  associations  and 
the trade unions an information paper on the 
situation in the automobile industry. t 
Parliament hu held a wide-ranpna debate on 
this  industry,  reaultina  in  the  adoption  of a 
resolution on 13 January 1981.2 
The  trade  asaociations  and  the  trade  unions 
have expreaaed their opinions in detailed posi-
tion papers. 
The  Economic  and  Social  Committee  hu 
decided to aet up a workina party on the auto-
mobile induatry. 
Lastly, the Commission has repeatedly broupt 
to the attention of the Council the  need for  a 
common commercial policy towards Japan, the 
importance of which  waa  recently  hipliJhted 
by the voluntary restraint aart:ement concernina 
Japanese  automobile  exports  to  the  United 
States. 
All  the  economic  and  social  parties  involved 
now broadly aaree in their analysis of the situa-
tion  and on the  extent of the  chanaes  which 
must  be  made  by  the  European  automobile 
industry.  It muat  continue to play the leadina 
role which it enjoys in the Community by main-
tainina its international competitiveness. Faced 
with  Japanese  competition,  the  aims  of the 
American  industry and the emeraence of new 
producers,  the  European  industry  must  con-
tinue  to  adapt  its  industrial  and  commercial 
bue which  is  vulnerable  because  automobile 
construction is so heteroaeneous and manufac-
ture of components so dispersed. This calls for 
increased efforts to rationalize the apparatus of 
production,  to  exploit  and  develop  existin& 
technolo&ical  knowhow  and  to  improve  the 
efficiency of  the distribution systems. 
Naturally, it is  the  companies themselves  that 
are the most directly concerned, and the main 
responsibility for takina action lies  with them. 
Nevertheless,  all  economic  operaton  which 
have an interest in,  or have some  meaaure of 
responsibility  for  ensurina  that  this  industry 
•  Fourteenth General Report, point 156. 
2  OJ C 28, 9. 2.  1981: Bull. EC 1-1911, point 2.3.7. 
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runs  smoothly should do all  in  their power to 
encouraae its development. 
The  European  automobile  industry  needs  an 
economic environment in which it can continue 
with  and  step  up  the  adjustments  it  baa 
embarked on in order to improve its competi-
tiveness,  adjustments which  entail a  consider-
able amount of investment. 
2.  Aaainst this backaround and in view of the 
difficult situation on the  world  and European 
markets, the Commission considers it necessary 
to  examine  this  sector  in  order to  expreas  in 
detail  its  opinion  on the  problems  facina  the 
automobile industry. 
The study 'Structure and prospects of the Euro-
pean  automobile  industry-1981'  has  three 
main objectives: 
•  to Jive a reply to all the economic operaton 
involved in the smooth functionina of the auto-
mobile  industry  in  response  to  the  positions 
they  have  expressed,  and  call  upon  them  to 
shoulder  their  responsibilities  alona  the  lines 
proposed.  The  document  is  in  this  respect  a 
startina point;  it  will  be expanded u  reaards 
matters relatina to components and distribution 
and will be replarly updated; 
•  to serve as a reference in the context of the 
discussions with the other industrialized coun-
tries  (USA,  Japan, Sweden,  etc.) on the pros-
pects  of the  automobile  industry;  it  specifies 
the points on which it is  necessary to adopt a 
position  in  order to  bqin a  dialoaue  of this 
kind.  Such  exchanaes of views  should  not be 
restricted  to  a  discussion  of short-term  prob-
lems  and the examination of economic ques-
tions.  In view of the international character of 
the automobile industry, and the arowina inter-
penetration  of production  and  tradina  struc-
tures,  the  useuments made  of the  lona-term 
prospects of this branch of industry should be 
compared; 
•  to reply to the resolution on the automobile 
industry adopted by  Parliament on  13 January 
1981. In this respect, this document will also be 
of interest to all the other Community institu-
tions and bodies. The  Community institutions 
have no mandate to determine and implement 
the  requisite chanaes in  this  sector.  The main 
responsibility  for  takin1  action  lies  with  the 
firms  concerned.  However, the Commission  is 
anxious to ensure that the best possible use  is 
S.2/81 made of the instruments at its disposal in  the 
current situation. 
Community action 
J.  The Commission  proposes to cany out a 
series of coordinated measures  aimed  at  sup-
portina the efforts of the European automobile 
indu1try  to  improve  its  competitiveness.  at 
facilitatina  the  adjustments  required  and  at 
creatina an appropriate economic environment. 
This action, which muat be carried out in close 
cooperation with the Member States, will focus 
on four aspects: 
The Internal market 
4.  It  is  imperative  to  strenathen the internal 
market and to derive maximum benefit from its 
inherent dynamics, i.e. from the combination of 
the  various  advantaaes  arisina  from  its  size. 
Efforts will be made to create a more propitious 
climate for the Community's automobile indus-
try by: 
•  Strlt~irtg for  gr«~t~r hannonization  of those 
aspects which  have not yet  been brought into 
line,  in  particular where  taxations and eneriY 
are  concerned.  The  Commission  would 
emphasize in this respect the drawbacks of the 
continuina  differences  between  the  national 
taxation systems which have caused a fraamen-
tation of the Community market. It would like 
its endeavoun as reaards the harmonization of 
tax 1tructures to be accompanied by action by 
the Member States to approximate the rates and 
levels of motor vehicle taxation, and in parti-
cular VAT on vehicles and motor fuel taxation. 
The  measures in question should be desianed 
not to discouraae automobile purchases in the 
Community and to encourqe eneray savinas. 
They mipt, for instance, result in the approxi-
mation of purchaSe taxes at a level sianificantly 
lower than that or certain Member States, with 
excise duties on motor fuel beina kept at a hiah 
level. 
•  Adapti"'  l~ri.rlatlort to developments in the 
economic,  technoloaical  and  ener&Y  fields. 
Often in the past, matten relatinJ to lepslation 
have been di1cussed with too little concern for 
the  pneral  context.  An  approach  must  be 
found which  covers  the safety,  environmental 
S.2/81 
and eneray-IM'ina aspects all at the same time. 
It mu1t be deviled collectively and must aim at 
setting  medium- and  lona-term  objectives 
desianed to provide companies in the automo-
bile industry, where lead times are major con-
straints,  1 with the information that they need in 
order to shape  their  development.  A  method 
such as  this, and the adoption of Community 
type-approval  for  motor vehicles,  would  also 
encouraae our car makers to be more dynamic, 
particularly in their relations with their partners 
in other parts of the world, and would set the 
scene  for  a  constructive  dialoaue  with  non-
Community countries. 
•  Promoti111  irfllot~ation throuah a set of one-ofT 
or onJOina operations, the main aim of which 
would be to help the Community industry aain 
a  better awareness of requirements and poui-
bilitiea, and which could consist in: 
taking  stock  of . research,  development  and 
innovation work under way or planned in the 
Community,  so  as  to  have  a  clearer  idea  of 
what has been achieved and clarify the options; 
makina a contribution to the pursuit of studies 
or  pilot  projects  recopized  as  beina  very 
important  (au  turbines,  multi-fuel  ensines, 
etc.); 
settina up  observation  and joint consultation 
machinery the purpose of which  would be to 
provide all the parties concerned with informa-
tion and conltitute a  forum  for  exchanaes of 
views  on developments abroad, and the long-
term  requirements  on  the  various  markets 
tbroupout the world etc.; 
encouraaina the settina up of or involvement 
with technical centres for research and innova-
tion concernina automobile components; 
definina  coordinated  research  proarammes 
involvina  induavy,  universitiea  and  public 
authorities, and Bettina up centres of excellence 
for  advanced  tecbnoiQIY,  brinaina  toaether 
car-makm,  acceuories  manufacturers  and 
State-run  laboratories  (in  connection  with 
hip-temperature materials or composite mate-
rials, for example). 
• It takes about fivt yean to advance from liM daip  stqe to 
series production of a new model. 
7 The structural development of the 
Industry 
5.  The  Commission  has  special  responsibili-
ties  here  because  of its  powers  in  the  field  of 
competition and the financial instruments at its 
disposal. 
Maintaining  and  improving  the  competitive-
ness  of the  European  motor industry must  be 
the  essential  aim  of  structural  adjustments. 
Consequently: 
•  When  applying the Community competition 
rules the Commission will  give  due considera-
tion to the need for closer cooperation - both 
within  the  industry  and  with  other  industries 
earlier or later in the production chain - which 
does not distort competition on the world mar-
ket.  This  assessment is  naturally based on the 
principle  that  the  common  market  remains 
open. 
•  Where  State  aid  is  concerned  the  Commis-
sion will  supplement the  existing rules  by  set-
ting  up  a  system  for  the  post-monitoring  of 
national aid,  including specific aid  as  well  as 
the application of non-specific schemes to the 
automobile sector. Indiscriminate use of public 
funds could lead to overcapacity; it might rein-
force  the trend towards  protectionist measures 
or encourage the granting of different aid later, 
for  conversion  purposes.  Moreover,  the  Mem-
ber States  with  limited  funds  available  would 
be  the  ones  most  affected  by  a  'beggar-my-
neighbour' approach to State aid. 
This system  would increase the information at 
the Commission's disposal. 
It would  ensure  greater  overall  transparency, 
and provide a common reference basis for dis-
cussions  between  the  Commission  and  the 
Member States  concerning  matters  relating  to 
adjustment by the industry, thereby enhancing 
the  discipline required  as  regards  the granting 
of aid and averting the danger of overcapacity 
arising within the Community. 
•  Lastly, the use of Community instruments for 
the  benefit  of the  motor  industry,  which  has 
received  considerable  support  in  recent  years, 
will  have to satisfy criteria aimed at encourag-
ing the industry's efforts to improve its produc-
tivity  and  to  rationalize  components  produc-
tion, taking into account the different situations 
and locations of Community firms. 
8 
These criteria will  be designed to contribute to 
greater  integration  of activities  in  the  Com-
munity,  to  encourage  investment  in  the  high-
value-added  stages  of production  and  to  pro-
mote  technological  development  and  automa-
tion. 
Only  by  increasing  competitiveness  and  by 
applying  technological  advances  rapidly  can 
jobs be safeguarded, not only in the automobile 
industry but also in the industries which supply 
it and depend on it. 
These  new  criteria might also serve as  a refer-
ence basis for the Member States and thus have 
a stimulating effect. 
Changes In employment 
6.  The Commission attaches great importance 
to the questions relating to employment, which 
must  also  be  taken  into  consideration  along 
with and on the same basis as the other aspects. 
Given  the  rapidly  changing  economic  and 
industrial  conditions,  it  is  particularly  impor-
tant that all  the economic operators concerned 
should  display  the  dynamism  and  flexibility 
that  the  scale  of  the  adjustment  required 
entails.  First, a  clearer picture must be  gained 
of the effects on employment and working con-
ditions  that the changes  which  the  industry  is 
currently undergoing will  have. This is  a prere-
quisite for  effective action in  this  field.  In the 
current situation, the lack of adequate informa-
tion and detailed research on this subject is dis-
turbing - it  restricts both the number of ways 
of adapting to the changes in  practice and the 
companies'  ability  to  find  staff which  satisfy 
their requirements. 
The Commission will  look into this problem in 
more detail. First of all, it will collect and eval-
uate,  if  possible  at  the  level  of the  various 
regions,  information  and  forecasts  relating  to 
the  consequences  that  changes  in  production, 
and  in  particular  automation,  might  have  as 
regards  employment,  qualifications and work-
ing conditions, and contribute to the work to be 
done to this end. 
Dialogue with the Community's 
trading partners 
7.  As an exporter, the Community's car indus-
try  needs to be  competitive on the world  mar-
S.2/81 ket. This will only be possible in the context of 
an open market.  In its efforts to find solutions 
to international problems, the Commission will 
seek to draw full  advantages from  the current 
trend towards greater international  integration 
of automobile production, as  witnessed by the 
growing  number  of  cooperation  agreements 
and external investments: 
•  with  a  view  to rationalization and stabiliza-
tion  of  commercial  structures,  based  on 
increased trade in components, spare parts and 
technology: 
•  by means of a coherent Community commer-
cial  policy towards  non-Community countries. 
The  present  situation,  and  the  concomitant 
fragmentation of the market, have slowed down 
the process of adapting the Community indus-
try.  The efforts to bring national strategies into 
line  under  a  common  commercial  policy 
implies  a  gradual  adjustment  of imports  into 
the Community as  a whole and the promotion 
of exports to non-member countries. 
The  Commission will  actively  pursue  the  dia-
logue with its trading partners in order to arrive 
at the desired results. 
These  guidelines  and  the  underlying  analysis 
on which they are based are set out in detail in 
'Structure and prospects of the  European auto-
mobile industry-1981'. 
The  Commission  intends  to  hold  discussions 
with  the  other  Community  institutions  and 
bodies, governments, the trade associations and 
the trade unions and its  main trading partners 
in the next few  months in order to build on the 
ideas expressed in this document. 
S.2/81  9 Structure and prospects of the European 
automobile industry-1981 Summery 
8.  The European automobile industry is faced 
with one of the  most fundamental  changes in 
its  history,  and  the  magnitude  of the  adjust-
ments to be pursued is now generally realized. 
The  firms  in  this  industry  are,  of course,  the 
parties most directly concerned, but the struc-
tural adjustment needed is so great that all the 
economic operators affected by the automobile 
industry have a part to play in this process. 
A careful examination of the facts is needed in 
order to see  what the  various  parties  can and 
must do in order to help this industry to adapt 
to the changed circumstances. 
In view of the problems facing the automobile 
industry, the Commission has thought it worth-
while to  examine all  the background informa-
tion at its disposal in order to produce a  sum-
mary report. As the Commission is anxious that 
the resources at its disposal should be adminis-
tered  as  efficiently  as  possible  in  the  present 
situation, an examination of what it is doing in 
this connection has been incorporated into the 
fabric of this analysis in  order to give  a  clear 
idea of the emphasis it wishes to  impart. This 
approach,  which  is  set  out  in  detail  in  this 
paper,  places  the  European  industry  in  the 
world context before taking a look at the likely 
developments. 
9.  The main conclusions of this  analysis can 
be summarized as follows: 
Automobile  trends  worldwide  have  entered  a 
new phase characterized by significant changes 
in: 
demand:  the  growth  in  demand  has  slowed 
down, demand has become more international 
in  character, and its responsiveness to  cyclical 
factors has increased; 
technology: this has now become a fundamental 
factor  in  the  competitiveness  of firms,  which 
must incorporate it at a  faster rate in  products 
and factories; 
production: this is affected by rapid automation 
and  a  redistribution  of  value-added  towards 
upstream industries and new sectors; 
trade: there is, at one and the same time, a shift 
towards the most efficient manufacturing areas 
and a  structural reallocation  whereby  finished 
products are being replaced by components; 
ll 
employment: influenced by the consequences of 
the  search  for  greater productivity and by  the 
need for  more qualified manpower adapted to 
the use of advanced technologies. 
These trends obviously affect all carmakers. In 
this context, the European automobile industry 
has to cope with: 
the  competitiveness  of the  Japanese  industry. 
with  its  highly  efficient  productive apparatus, 
low production costs (20% to 30% below those 
of  Community  manufacturers),  and  unparal-
leled sales drive; 
the ambitions of  the  US industry. which was put 
out of its  stride by the second oil crisis, but is 
determined  to  restore  its  competitive  position 
by investing enormous sums of money; 
the emergence of new competitors,  who wish to 
expand their trade and establish their industrial 
growth on the basis of the automobile industry. 
10.  Over the last few decades, the automobile 
industry  has been  a  focal  point for  economic 
development within the Community, not only 
because of its direct impact but also because of 
its stimulating effect on many basic industries. 
In future, the Community automobile industry 
can play a decisive role in the development of 
high-technology  industries (robots, electronics, 
etc.). 
It must, however: 
keep  up  its  trading  strength.  which  is  being 
underminded by a weakening of its position on 
the home market and the erosion of its position 
on foreign markets; 
reorganize its industrial base, which  has a  vul-
nerable look about it because of its  heteroge-
neous character where motor vehicle manufac-
ture  is  concerned, and  its  dispersed  character 
where the manufacture of components is  con-
cerned. 
Despite these structural weaknesses, _the  Com-
munity automobile industry is  capable of mak-
ing considerable progress: 
by rationalizing its productive apparatus, i.e.  by 
streamlining its structures and modernizing its 
equipment; 
by  exploiting  and  developing  its  technological 
lead; 
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which  can  make  a  biger contribution  to  the 
effectiveness of its marketing efforts. 
In  order  to  adjust  the  productive  structures, 
with a view to making the industry more com-
petitive, there is a need: 
where the industry is concerned: for closer coop-
eration,  which  can  quite  easily  be  organized 
without affecting the conditions of competition 
adversely,  and  for  particular  attention  to  be 
paid to State intervention; 
in this connection, a Community system for the 
post-monitoring  of State  aid. would  make  it 
possible  to  guarantee  the  requisite  degree  of 
transparency and pave the way for the Commis-
sion  and  the  Member  States  to  pool  their 
thoughts with a view to making the adjustments 
easier; 
where  the financial side is concerned: for  large-
scale  investment  programmes  entailing  the 
mobilization  of  considerable  financial 
resources.  It might be desirable to rethink the 
criteria for the granting of Community support, 
in order to encourage improvements in produc-
tivity  and  the  rationalization  of  component 
manufacture; 
where  technology is  concerned: for the stimula-
tion of research and development as part of a 
long-term  view  of  the  development  of  the 
motor  vehicle  in  general.  This  can  only  be 
achieved  by  exploiting  the  spin-off resulting 
from  cooperation  not  only  among  firms  but 
also with public authorities, the universities and 
llll the parties concerned; 
where regional and social aspects are concerned: 
for the geographical reorganization of produc-
tion for the benefit of the less-favoured regions, 
for the redistribution of labour between sectors 
and for the qualitative redistribution of labour. 
A consensus between the economic and social 
partners and the relaxation of institutional rig-
idity would appear, in this respect, to be prere-
quisites for adjustments capable of reconciling 
an  improvement  in  working  conditions  with 
better use of the productive apparatus. 
11.  The  dynamics  of  the  internal  market 
would  appear to  be  the  requisite  catalyst  for 
this process: 
by  making it  possible  to  create a more favour-
able general environment;this presupposes closer 
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harmonization of the  conditions  affecting the 
motor  vehicle  in  general  in  the  Community 
(transport, taxation and insurance matters) and 
the continuation of the work to remove the bar-
riers  to the creation of a genuine Community 
motor vehicle market; 
as a result of legislation being adjusted in line 
with economic, technological and energy devel-
opments. In this respect, the Commission takes 
the  view  that  an  overall  approach  is  needed 
which takes into account, at one and the same 
time, energy-saving, environmental and safety 
considerations with a  view  to obtaining a har-
monious body of legislation which will help to 
defend the  Community industry's competitive 
position. This presupposes, of course, that deci-
sions taken on the subject in relation to other 
markets should also be taken into account. 
12.  Lastly,  it  is  of vital  importance  for  the 
Community that its automobile industry should 
make  suitable adjustments  so  that  it  can slot 
into the future framework of international equi-
libria. To this end: 
trade patterns must not evolve in such a way as 
to cause a shrinkage of the European industrial 
base as a result of excessive, one-sided concen-
tration of trade on finished products. A careful 
analysis  of trends  in  the  development of the 
motor  car  clearly  reveals  the  economic  and 
industrial capacity for securing - as a result of 
increasing integration of motor vehicle  manu-
facturing worldwide - stable, healthy commer-
cial  structures  founded  on  increased  trade  in 
components and on the orderly future location 
of production units; 
investment  outside  the  three  main  producing 
areas is the most suitable way of brinJina about 
this  new  equilibrium  by encouraging economic 
interpenetration, an objective which is desirable 
in the context of industrial cooperation, which 
would now seem to be the only way of increas-
ing  the  sector's  economic  effectiveness  and 
relieving  the  tension  on  the  markets.  Such 
investment should therefore  be encouraged in 
the context of closer consultation between the 
economic and political agencies concerned. 
13 Part One 
The European automobile 
industry in the world context 
13.  In  order  to  assess  the  outlook  for  the 
European automobile industry, we  should first 
of all  place it  in  the  world context, since  the 
only way  to  pinpoint the adjustments needed 
so that it can take its place on favourable terms 
in  the context of the future  pattern of econo-
mic, industrial and commercial equilibria is  to 
examine the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of the 
Community automobile industry in relation to 
the development of the conditions of interna-
tional competition. 
With  this aim in view,  Part One of this report 
seeks: 
•  to bring out the likely trends in the develop-
ment of the motor car and the factors liable to 
affect  the  competitive  position  of the  main 
producing areas; 
•  to  analyse,  against  this  background,  the 
Community  industry's  advantages  and  disad-
vantaaes. 
Development of the conditions 
of international competition 
14.  The expansion of the motor car worldwide 
has entered a new phase characterized by sub-
stantial  changes  in  demand,  technology,  pro-
duction conditions and trade patterns. This is a 
fact of life for all car-makers, but it is  not the 
only factor  with  which  the European industry 
must come to terms.  There are also the ambi-
tions of the  US  automobile industry, and the 
emCIJence of new competitors, not to mention 
the competitiveness of the Japanese industry. 
A new at•ge In the development of 
the motor c•r 
15.  Most  experts  who  have  examined  the 
main factors  in the development of the motor 
car have come to broadly similar conclusions 
which in fact tend to give the lie to the idea of a 
sector in  crisis,  at least in  the sense in  which 
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this term has been used to describe other indus-
tries in very serious difficulties. 
The trends which have determined the develop-
ment of the motor car ever since it was invented 
are still there in the background influencing the 
sector's long-term prospects. The main factor is, 
of course, the increase in car ownership world-
wide, and the following figures give some idea 
of the importance of this factor: while there are 
540 cars  in  the  United  States (and 332  in  the 
Community)  per  I 000  inhabitants,  the  world 
average is only 79 cars per I 000 inhabitants. 1 
However,  the  world  automobile  industry  has 
entered a new phase not because of a change in 
the nature of the factors determining its growth, 
but  because  of changes  in  the  relationships 
between these factors which have combined to 
lay the foundations for a new order. 
An  examination of these  changes, which  con-
cern the features of demand, the role of tech-
nology,  production  conditions  and trade  pat-
terns, makes it possible both to understand the 
process  of change  which  is  under  way  and 
explain  the  adjustments  which  require  to  be 
made. 
The features of  demand 
16.  The  demand  for  motor  vehicles  is,  of 
course,  responsive  to  the  general  economic 
environment,  and  in  particular  the  conse-
quences of the energy crisis. The general down-
turn  in  demand, as  a  result of the second oil 
crisis,  is  no different  in  this  respect  from  the 
downturn  following  the  1973  crisis,  and  the 
experts are therefore not expecting demand to 
pick up in 1981. 
In  the longer term, most of the sources avail-
able take the view that demand will  probably 
have three main features in the years ahead: 
Slower arowth 
The  number  of cars  sold  worldwide  rose  by 
5·6% per annum between  1975  and  1980,  but 
the  estimated  average  rate  for  the  next  five 
years is some 3 % per annum, probably mainly 
because of the gradual saturation of the tradi-
1  Annex  I. 
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has reached a fairly  high level, 1 and the sensi-
tivity  of the new  markets  to general  economic 
trends. Moreover, the evolution of the demand 
is very uncertain, for it is difficult to assess the 
repercussions  of the  profound  changes  which 
will  affect the  automotive  production  and use 
(rail/road  balance  on  the  one  hand,  and 
public/private transport on the other). 
A number of factors liable to influence the val-
idity of these forecasts and the possible conse-
quences if they tum out to  be  accurate should 
be emphasized: 
•  The estimates in  question relate to the num-
ber  of  vehicle  registrations.  However,  the 
increasing sophistication  of motor cars,  which 
is likely to be accentuated as a result of fuel res-
trictions, entails a considerable increase in their 
value added content. As  a result of the lack of 
forecasts of value added, the foreseeable trend 
in  demand in  real  economic terms  is  therefore 
underestimated; 
•  The growing saturation of the motor vehicle 
market  in  the  developed  countries,  on  which 
these forecasts  are based, could be  called into 
question as a result of the rapid obsolescence of 
the  vehicles  now  on the  road  because of sub-
stantial technical advances.  In this case, motor 
vehicles might be replaced more quickly on the 
traditional markets, and the  United States will 
probably be the first  country to  witness such a 
change. 
Greater respoaslveness to cyclical facton 
The  reasons  for  this  are  that  the  demand  for 
replacement  vehicles  is  now  the  predominant 
factor in the developed countries, and that the 
developing countries and the planned-economy 
countries (where  most  of the growth  potential 
of the new markets lies) are heavily dependent 
on external energy sources. 
Greater vehicle standardization 
This  applies  at  least  as  regards  the  basic fea-
tures and is the result of fuel-consumption and 
cost  constraints.  This  factor  is  particularly 
important  as  it  has  major  structural  implica-
tions with regard to production conditions. 
1  Annex  I. 
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Ths rols of  technology 
17.  The role of technological advances in the 
development of the motor car and the pace of 
implementation  of these  advances  have  not 
been particularly significant in recent decades. 
The  automobile  industry  has  experienced  a 
long period of comparative technological stag-
nation: present motor vehicle design dates back 
to the  191 Os, series manufacturing to the 1920s, 
and front-wheel  drive, four-wheel  independent 
suspension  and  monopiece  bodies to  1935  or 
thereabouts. All the changes that have occurred 
since the first eneray crisis have now made the 
ability to  get  to  grips  with  technical  advances 
one of the  decisive  factors  in  firms'  competi-
tiveness. 
The  scientific  back-up  for  the  automobile 
industry will  increase considerably in  the  next 
few  years as a result of using new technologies 
for engine design, for reducing vehicle weiaht, 
for  greater  streamlining,  and  for  optimizing 
functions by makina greater use of electronics. 
While the most rapid progress will obviously be 
achieved  by  improving  existing  systems,  it  is 
extremely difficult to  predict the radical inno-
vations that will be made and the time that will 
be  required to make them generally available, 
because  of  uncertainties  surrounding  future 
energy availabilities and costs, the decisions of 
the  public authorities and the strateaies of the 
main manufacturers. 
One thing is certain, however-the firms' tech-
nological  capability  will  no  longer  be  simply 
one aspect of their competitiveness but a very 
condition of their survival. In the years ahead, 
therefore,  the  automobile  industry  will  be the 
scene of a  significant technological  revival  as 
regards  both  products  and  production  pro-
cesses, and motor vehicles in general will  con-
stitute a highly strategic sector for the compet-
ing countries. 
Production conditions 
18.  The  automobile  industry's  production 
conditions  have  developed  over  the  years  as 
part  of a  constant  striving  for  economies  of 
scale. 
As  a result of the considerable advances made 
in  the equipment industries, thanks to the use 
15 of electronics and the increasing uniformity of 
demand, this  striving  is  taking  new  forms  -
which  may  be  summarized  under three  head-
ings: 
•  automation of production processes; 
•  structural  alterations  to the  production  set-
up; 
•  switching of value-added between sectors. 
Automation of production processes 
/9.  The most advanced aspects of motor vehi-
cle  manufacturing  are  in  the  forefront  of the 
automation of manufacturing processes:  some 
plants are already 97% automated: the general-
ization of this development will be a feature of 
the  coming  decade  for  the  car-makers  them-
selves  and for  the  components manufacturers 
and the upstream industries, as it is an essential 
element  of  the  firms'  competitiveness.  For 
example, 50% of Japan's industrial robot pro-
duction  (Japan  being  the  leading  producer 
worldwide) is  already earmarked for the auto-
mobile  industry,  US  manufacturers  are  plan-
ning  to  buy  5 billion  dollars  worth  of  new 
machine-tools in  the next five  years,  and cer-
tain  European  motor  manufacturers  are  pro-
ducing automated equipment which is  not sur-
passed anywhere in terms of technology. 
This move towards automation, which is also a 
decisive factor in the context of greater produc-
tion flexibility, combined with the increasingly 
international character of the sector, is  fuelling 
a radical change in the production set-up. 
Structural alterations to the production 
set-up 
20.  The  automobile  industry  has  for  a  long 
time been  the epitome of assembly-line-based 
mass production. Two factors have for a  num-
ber of  years been exerting a growing influence: 
•  The  'world  car'  concept resulting  from  the 
increasing uniformity of the motor vehicle mar-
ket. The term 'world car' does not refer to the 
manufacturing  of  identical  vehicles  for  the 
entire world market, but to the designing of cars 
which  can be assembled for different  markets 
from  components made on a  large scale in  a 
small number of production units; 
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•  Varying scales of production runs: car-mak-
ing can be divided into stages each of which, 
according to studies carried out on the subject, 
have different optimum scales of production. A 
few  figures  will  help to make this clearer.  For 
example, the minimum production level would 
seem to be around 500 000 units per annum for 
the manufacture of engines. On the other hand, 
where  assembly  is  concerned,  annual  runs  of 
I  00 000 to 150 000 units would make it possible 
to  exploit the  essence of economies of scale. 
Unit distribution and associated costs would be 
halved  if  500 000  vehicles  were  produced 
instead of I  00 000. 
These two factors naturally have a considerable 
effect on the overall production set-up. 
Switching of value-added between sectors 
21.  Increased use of highly-automated equip-
ment, the need to manufacture components on 
an  adequate  production  scale,  and increasing 
sophistication  of vehicles  ultimately  entails  a 
redistribution of value-added between sectors: 
•  towards the manufacture of components, the 
prime target area for the incorporation of tech-
nical advances; 
•  towards  the  equipment  industries  which 
produce the machinery used; 
•  towards  maintenance  activities,  meaning 
both the maintenance of production equipment 
and the maintenance of the vehicles themselves 
(use  of  sophisticated  checking  and  control 
equipment, for example). 
Special  attention  should  be  devoted  to  this 
aspect,  not  only  in  order to  assess  the  social 
effects of the changes under way (a transfer of 
value-added will  also entail a transfer of jobs), 
but also in order to assess the regional impact 
(alteration  of the  geographical  distribution  of 
production units) and the international impact 
(implications for trade patterns). 
Trade patterns 
22.  The above  factors  will  inevitably  have a 
considerable  impact  on  the  development  of 
trade  patterns,  especially  in  conjunction  with 
the  economic  decisions  of  certain  countries 
with regard to the geographical distribution of 
production activities. 
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ways: 
•  A growing tendency for assembly units to be 
located in  the  markets to be served, as  a result 
of a technical capability combined with the pol-
itical  will  of  many  countries  to  develop  an 
automobile industry; 
•  A corresponding increase in trade in  compo-
nents, equipment and technology to  the detri-
ment  of  trade  in  complete  cars.  The  Com-
munity  has  already  been  affected  by  this 
development.'  In  1979,  spare  parts  accounted 
for  more than 31  % of Community automotive 
exports,  compared  with  23 %  in  1970.  This 
phenomenon should soon spread to the United 
States. US  manufacturers are expected to make 
considerable  purchases  from  their  European 
subsidiaries  and  from  Japan,  whose  *Ies  of 
spare  parts  abroad  will,  according  to  certain 
estimates  account  for  40 %  of  automotive 
exports in  1985, compared with 20% at present. 
The  various  manufacturing  zones  are  in  very 
different  positions  for  embarking on  this  new 
stage in  the development of the motor car, and 
they  have  already  planned  their  strategies. 
When  looking  at  the  competition  with  which 
the  Community industry  will  have to come to 
terms, three main factors  should be taken into 
account:  the  competitiveness  of the  Japanese 
manufacturers, the intentions of the  US  manu-
facturers and the emergence of new producers. 
The competitiveness of the 
Japanese Industry 
23.  This is  the first challenge which the Euro-
pean  automobile  industry  will  have  to  meet. 
Japan is the country which, in recent years, has 
best  succeeded  in  coping  with  the  constraints 
which  are a feature of the  new conditions sur-
rounding  the  development  of the  motor  car 
worldwide.  The results are there for all  to see, 
but the  important thing  is  to  analyse  the  rea-
sons  for  this  competitiveness and the outlook 
for the future. 
1  Annex 2. 
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Results 
24.  In  1952 there were  100 000 foreign cars in 
Japan out of a total of 130 000. 
In  1980,  Japan made 7 050 000 passenger cars, 
more  than  3 800 000  of which  were  exported. 
Between 1970 and 1980, the Community's auto-
mobile  production  remained  virtually  stable 
and  exports  fell  by  nearly  23 %  in  terms  of 
units,  whereas  Japan's  production  rose  by 
122 % and her exports by 426 %.  1 
The reasons for  Japan's success 
25.  Many  reasons  have  been  advanced  to 
explain the success of the Japanese automobile 
industry:  productivity,  social  and  labour fac-
tors,  the  exploitation of currency  fluctuations, 
etc. However, the reasons for the high degree of 
competitiveness  achieved  by  the  Japanese 
manufacturers  cannot  be  broken  down  into 
neat,  individual  packages, since  it  is  the  end-
product  of  (i)  a  long-term  development 
approach  whereby  investment  decisions  are 
guided  by  encouraging  the  modernization  of 
processes and products, and (ii)  an  integrated 
organizational  set-up  in  which  the  optimum 
level of industrial and commercial efficiency is 
encouraged. 
A lon1-term development strategy 
26.  Jap.anese  firms  generally  adopt  an 
approach focusing  more on the industrial side 
than the financial side, in that they attach less 
importance to  immediate  profitability  than  to 
the  consolidation  of  trading  positions.  This 
expansionary policy has led Japanese manufac-
turers to devote a greater proportion of value-
added  to  investment  than  that earmarked  by 
their  American  or  European  competitors. 
Between  1974  and  1977,  the  proportion  of 
value-added  earmarked  for  investment  by  the 
three  main  Japanese manufacturers  was  35 %, 
on  average,  compared  with  only  around  18% 
for  the  ten  main  European  companies  and 
barely 14% for the four main American groups. 
This  investment  effort,  the  funding  of which 
was  made  easier  by  considerable  internal 
resources and the implementation of which was 
1  Annexes I and 3. 
17 facilitated  by  favourable  tax  provtstons,  has 
focused on increasing production capacity and 
improving  productivity  through  the  intensive 
automation of production  lines.  According to 
some estimates half of all the industrial robots 
at present in existence worldwide are installed 
in Japanese factories. 1  Accordingly, in the last 
twenty years, the productivity of the Japanese 
automobile industry has increased twice as fast 
as that of the European industry and four times 
as fast as that of the US industry. Furthermore, 
this investment by the Japanese manufacturers 
could not have been so effective had there not 
also been: 
•  a  very  rapid improvement in  the qualifica-
tions of the  workforce:  in Japanese car facto-
ries,  two-thirds  of  skilled  and  semi-skilled 
workers  have  the  equivalent of GCE  A  level 
qualifications; 
•  considerable improvements in productivity in 
the  components  industry:  according  to  an 
interim report on the car components industries 
in the European Community and Japan, prod-
uctivity in  this sector is  twice the Community 
average.  This  factor  is  of course  particularly 
important in view of the strategic role of com-
ponents manufacture and the structure of the 
Japanese automobile industry in which subcon-
tracting (buying-in) can be as much as 6S % to 
80% compared with SO%  to SS % in the Com-
munity. 
A perfectly iateanted iadustrialaad sales 
l)'ltem 
27.  The Japanese automobile industry's prod-
uction  and  marketing  set-up  has  some  very 
individual  features  which  are  reflected  in  the 
optimum integration of all industrial and distri-
bution aspects. 
The main advantages are as follows: 
•  very  fluid  production  flows:  As  a  result of 
numerous financial links, Japanese motor vehi-
cle manufacturers have a considerable measure 
of control over their components suppliers.  In 
1  It should be emphasized in  this connection that the riaures 
available are very difficult to interpret and are often disputed, 
as there is  no  clear definition of the term 'industrial robot'. 
Accordina  to  the  calculations  made  by  Renault  usina  the 
Japanese  classification,  the  number  of  robots  used  in  the 
European  and  Japanese  automotive  industries  seem  to  be 
about the same. 
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addition, the  Kanban system  for the ordering 
and routing of materials developed by Toyota 
ties most of the suppliers to the manufacturers, 
who  can  therefore  efficiently  coordinate  sup-
plies  to  production  lines,  keep  the  level  of 
stocks of spare parts to a minimum, and benefit 
from  a  two-way  flow  of  information  which 
facilitates the close coordination of production; 
•  extremely  efficient  distribution  systems, 
thanks to the delivery of vehicles as a result of 
using  sophisticated  data-processing  facilities 
(and  even  a  satellite  for  the  transmission  of 
orders)  and  a  centralized  transport  fleet  with 
rates 40 % below European rates. 
•  an  excellent  balance  between  supply  and 
demand,  particularly  on  external  markets, 
owing to  the  manufacture  of products  which 
satisfy ethe  specific  needs  of  these  markets 
(whereas, in many cases, their competitors tend 
to try  and export the surplus of a  production 
adapted to their own market) and to the imme-
diate reaction of manufacturers to consumers' 
wishes. 
Last but not least, one of the main factors in the 
efficiency  of  the  Japanese  industry  is  the 
extremely  favourable  social  climate,  resulting 
for  example  in  the  virtual  absence  of strikes 
and  the  extremely  high  rate  of utilization  of 
productive  equipment  (the  average  period  of 
utilization in Japan is  estimated to be around 
2 000 hours per annum, compared with I 717 in 
France  and  l 626  in  the  Federal  Republic of 
Germany,  according  to  the  French  Chambre 
Syndical and the German VDA). 
All  these factors combine to give the Japanese 
automobile  industry  considerable  advantages 
over  its  rivals,  the  most  striking  advantage 
being the difference in production costs, which 
are 20% to 30% lower in Japan than in Europe. 
In the circumstances, it  is  very  important that 
we should analyse the likely developments. 
The future outlook 
28.  At this stage, let us confine ourselves to an 
analysis of the Japanese manufacturers' known 
projects and stated objectives, since the general 
question of future international equilibria in the 
industry,  which  will  depend on the  decisions 
taken  in  the  various  manufacturing  zones,  is 
considered in detail in Part Two of this report. 
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turers are going to make  12 000 million dollars 
worth  of investment  in  Japan  over  the  next 
three years in order to replace models and pro-
ductive  equipment,  increases  in  production 
capacity  being  confined  mainly  to  small-
engined  (SOOcc)  vehicles.  Although  this  infor-
mation contradicts certain  forecasts  predicting 
a  20 o/o  increase in  Japanese production capa-
city between  1981  and 1983, no final judgment 
can be made on this basis, since: 
•  according to a  recent  French  Senate report, 
the  MITI  has just adopted a  new  automobile 
industry  policy  providing  for  the  accelerated 
computerization of production processes with a 
view  to  doubling  labour  productivity  in  five 
years. The first incentive under this new policy 
is  to  be  a  special  depreciation  subsidy  to  be 
granted to manufacturers purchasing high-tech-
nology  robots.  Information  from  various 
sources also indicates that Toyota has ordered 
720 welding robots and is  planning to have its 
factories  running completely  automatically by 
1984; 
•  the  figures  quoted only refer  to  production 
units located in Japan. In fact, there arc several 
signs of a change in Japanese automobile stra-
tegy  towards  moderation  in  the  growth  of 
exports,  the  establishment of facilities  abroad 
and industrial diversification. It therefore looks 
as  if  the  Japanese  industry  is  changing  its 
emphasis in such a way as to make production 
and automobile assembly activities more inter-
national in character and to pursue a policy of 
investing  outside  the  automobile  sector.  The 
increasing  number  of  agreements  between 
Japanese,  European and American  companies 
and the emcraence of direct investment projects 
(Nissan in the United Kingdom) tends to con-
firm the first part of  this change of.policy. 
The  available  financial  resources  of  the 
Japanese companies arc so areat that they can-
not, in any case, all be ploughed back into the 
automobile industry. For example, according ~o 
a report that has already been mentioned, Nis-
san is JOing in for the manufacture of outboard 
motors and the series manufacture of complete 
boats, whilst Toyota, which  already has  bank-
ing  interests,  has  started  to  make  mass-pro-
duced prefabricated houses. 
All in all, the Japanese automobile industry has 
attained such a standard of efficiency, profita-
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bility and drive that it constitutes a major threat 
for its main competitors, and above all  for the 
North  American  industry,  on the  basis  of the 
strength  that  it  has  built  up  in  recent  years 
alone. 
The alme of the US automobile 
lnduetry 
Difficulties 
29.  In  1980  the  US  automobile  industry 
experienced the  most serious difficulties in  its 
history: 
•  the aggregate losses of the three main manu-
facturers  in  1980  are  estimated  at over  4 SOO 
million dollars; 
•  production  fell  by  almost  30 Ofo  compared 
with 1979; 
•  the  automobile  sector's  trading  deficit 
totalled over 13 000 million dollars and the rate 
of  foreign  penetration  of  the  US  market 
exceeded 25 o/o: 
•  nearly 300 000  workers  were  laid off by  the 
manufacturers, representing over one-quarter of 
the workforce employed in the sector. 
The reasons for this state of affairs can be sum-
marized in a few lines: The American manufac-
turers were not prepared for the sudden shift in 
demand towards small cars in the wake of the 
second enqy aisis. Accustomed as they were 
to  servicing  a  market  the  specific  features  of 
which constituted a barrier to foreisn competi-
tion, they went in for policies involving superfi-
cial changes to models instead of investins in 
productivity  and technological  improvements. 
Faced  with  the  pressure  from  the  Japanese 
manufacturers, which account for 80 o/o of auto-
mobile imports into the United States, the  US 
manufacturers  were  at  a  disadvantage  in  two 
respects: 
•  they  were  unable  to  handle  the  qualitative 
change in demand; 
•  their cost prices were much higher: according 
to fiaures  published by  the US  Department of 
Transportation,  Japanese  firms  have  a  cost 
price  advantage over American  firms  of I 000 
to  I SOO  dollan  per  car,  after  takin&  into 
account the cost of transport and access to the 
American market. 
19 The  automobile  industry  plays  a  much  more 
important role in the US economy than it does 
in the Community economy, not because of its 
intrinsic importance - which  is  directly com-
parable - but because of its role in the Ameri-
can transport system: 95 % of urban passenger 
journeys and 83 % of inter-city passenger jour-
neys are made by car in the United States. It is 
therefore  hardly  surprising  that  the  United 
States should wish  to  regain  its  supremacy in 
the world automobile industry. While this does 
not constitute an immediate threat to European 
manufacturers,  since  the  transition  period 
regarded as  being  necessary  for  the  American 
companies  will  run  until  at  least  1984,  this 
country's automobile projects will  have a deci-
sive  effect  on  medium-term  equilibria  in  the 
sector. 
Projects 
30.  Before examining the  implications of the 
US automobile industry's projects for the years 
ahead, we  should take a look at the objectives 
pursued,  the  resources  deployed  and  the  res-
'ponsibilities involved. 
The  American  manufacturers  are  atmmg  to 
completely reorganize their productive appara-
tus and the production set-up in order to manu-
facture  competitively  sufficient  vehicles  to 
satisfy estimated demand on the home market 
in  1985.  According to data worked  out by the 
Department of Transportation on the basis of 
the  investment  programmes  published  by  the 
firms concerned, the aim is to make  II million  I 
fuel-efficient  passenger  cars  (or  13 million 
fuel-efficient vehicles if vans and light commer-
cial vehicles are added) in the United States in 
1985. 
Re10t1n:es 
Total investment by the American groups in the 
next  five  years  has  been  estimated  at  70  to 
80 000  million  dollars,2  which  is  much  more 
1  This fiaurc includes estimated VW-USA output, i.e. 4SO 000 
units. but not the output of any other foreign  manufac:turers' 
plants. See Annex 4. 
z In constant dollars. 
lO 
than the cost of the Apollo programme. Most of 
this capital will, of course, be devoted to retool-
ing  and  downsizing  (at  an  estimated  cost  of 
56 000 million dollars), the remainder being for 
research and development and pre-manufacture 
and launching costs. 
This  investment  will,  of  course,  enable  US 
manufacturers  to  considerably  improve  their 
productivity, in  particular as  a result of buying 
a  lot of industrial robots (GM  is  proposing to 
double its stock of robots by 1983 to arrive at a 
total  of 470 units).  However,  this  investment 
will  take  some  time  to  implement,  which 
explains  the  extensive  recourse  to  another 
method of adjustment: technology and external 
supplies. 
American manufacturers have already signed or 
begun negotiations on a number of agreements 
with Japanese and European companies for the 
supply  of engines  and  other  components  for 
their new  models.  For example, Chrysler, is  to 
buy  one  million  engines  from  Mitsubishi 
between  1981  and  1985.  1  At  the  same  time, 
GM and Ford will  be calling to a large extent 
on their European and Latin American subsidi-
aries,  who  will  thus  play  a  much  more  active 
part in their world production set-up. 
What  is  more,  these  agreements  are  not  con-
fined  to  trade  in  components.  It should  be 
recalled in this connection that there have been 
strong  financial  links  for  a  number  of years 
between the US and Japanese companies: Ford 
holds  25 %  of  the  capital  of  Toyo  Kogyo, 
General  Motors  controls  34 %  of lsuzu,  and 
Chrysler owns 15 % of Mitsubishi. According to 
information recently reported in the press, Ford 
would seem to be about to conclude two agree-
ments, one with  Toyo  Kogyo  for  the  importa-
tion into the United States, as  from  1984, of a 
small-engined  car  completely  assembled  in 
Japan,  the  other  for  the  production  in  the 
United States, in conjunction with Toyota and 
Toyo  Kogyo,  of 300 000  light  vans  each  year 
with components mainly imported from Japan. 
Responsibilities 
31.  A wide-ranging discussion of the political 
aspects of the automobile sector in  the  United 
1  A table indicating some of the recent agreements is given in 
Annex 5. 
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pating the decisions  which  will  be  taken, it  is 
worth  examining  the  main  subjects  raised, 
which have a bearing on the responsibilities of 
all the economic operators concerned: 
At government  level,  a  self-restraint  agreement 
of the Japanese exports has been negotiated in 
order to  give  the  American  producers time  to 
make the necessary adjustments; help from the 
public authorities to make it easier for firms to 
find the investment capital required has, more-
over, been requested. 
In addition, particular thought is being given to 
the question of legislative policy, with a view to 
ensuring  closer  cooperation  between  industry 
and  government  in  the  setting  of objectives. 
The  American  administration  has  already 
decided  to  lighten  the  regulatory  constraints 
affecting car producers  by  cancelling some of 
the  regulations,  lengthening  implementation 
deadlines  and  facilitating  the  control  of pro-
grammes  already  started  (air-bags,  polluting 
emissions and energy consumption). 
Lastly, the taking into account of international 
competition  in  the  enforcement  of anti-trust 
legislation  and  the  training  campaigns  to  be 
pursued  in  order to  retrain  the  workforce  are 
matters of vital importance. 
The industry will have to improve its productiv-
ity,  step  up  its  research  and  development 
efforts, accept greater responsibility with regard 
to  the  environmental  and  social  impact of its 
production units and products, and reorganize 
its labour relations. 
The trade union organizations are faced with the 
need to come up with a wage strategy aimed at 
reducing the difference between labour costs in 
the United States and those in Japan. 1 One of 
the  ideas  put  forward  in  this  respect  is  wage 
concessions in exchange for profit-sharing. 
Consequences 
32.  The effects of this thorough reorganization 
of the US automobile industry are at once inter-
nal  and external, qualitative  and quantitative. 
The  internal  implications  have  been  analysed 
1  The table  in  Annex 6 gives  the  US  Administration·s esti-
mates on this matter. 
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in  detail by the US  Department of Transporta-
tion from the point of view of the: 
Social and regional impact. Even if the aims of 
the  US  manufacturers are  fulfilled,  i.e.  if they 
succeed in  producing  13  million  units  in  1985 
and in  winning back their home  market,  it  is 
likely  that  200 000  jobs  in  the  automobile 
industry  will  be  lost  between  1980  and  1985. 
The regional impact is  also likely to be consi-
derable, since the small number of new produc-
tion  units  to  be  built  will  in  many  cases  be 
located  outside  the  regions  in  which  the  old 
ones have been closed down; 1 
Commercial aspect: The US's 'automobile' defi-
cit is likely to continue to increase, in particular 
because of growing imbalance in trade in com-
ponents. 
The  external  effects  are  more  complicated  to 
analyse: 
qualitatively, the future outlook for  the  Ameri-
can  industry  matches  the  new  trends  in  the 
development of the motor car worldwide; 
quantitatively, and as  regards the development 
of the  balance of trade, forecasts  can  only be 
based  on  speculation  about  the  behaviour of 
the  rival  production  zones.  It  should  be 
emphasized,  however,  that  if  the  American 
companies' projects come off, there is  likely to 
be  a  surplus  automobile  production  capacity 
worldwide around  1983-85,  as  the  Department 
of Transportation has in fact already stated. 
Where the countries or producers involved are 
concerned,  of course,  this  risk  is  only  signifi-
cant in  terms of their competitiveness and the 
development of trade.  The  main problem, the 
possibility of which  must  be appreciated here 
and  now,  is  as  follows:  the  United  States  at 
present  imports  around  2 · 8  million  cars;  if 
domestic production capacity is  on a par with 
domestic demand in  1985, what will  happen to 
these imports? Three extreme cases can be con-
sidered: 
•  The  US  industry  will  succeed  in  winning 
back its  home market: In that case, where will 
the present imports go? 
•  The  US  industry  will  become  an  exporter: 
Who will buy its cars? 
'  90 o/o of US automobile production is concentrated in seven 
states. 
21 •  Another crisis  will  occur, even  more  serious 
than  the  present  one  in  view  of the  sums  of 
money committed. 
Careful  consideration  should,  of  course,  be 
given to these prospects, in particular in view of 
the  likely  increase  in  competition  that  will 
result  from  the  emergence  of new  producing 
countries. 
The emergence of new competitors 
33.  The  new  producer  countries  (countries 
other than North America, Japan and the Euro-
pean countries traditionally engaged  in  motor 
vehicle  manufacture)  have  so  far  played  a 
limited  role.  However,  their  share  of  world 
production has  steadily  increased,  rising  from 
I  0 · 3 o/o  to  19 · 8 o/o  between  1970  and  1980.  In 
order to assess their effect on the conditions of 
competition of the European automobile indus-
try,  they  should  be  subdivided  into  three 
groups:  the  State-trading countries,  the  coun-
tries  that have applied to become Community 
members, and the other countries (Latin Amer-
ica, Africa, Asia). 
The rise of  the Stste-trsding countries 
34.  In  1980,  the  Eastern  bloc  countries 
accounted  for  6·9 o/o  of world  motor  vehicle 
production.  The  development  of the  automo-
bile industry in these countries has been furth-
ered by the transfer of technology, mainly from 
Western  Europe,  in  particular in  the  form  of 
turnkey  factories  (e.g.  Togliatti  complex  built 
by  Fiat in  the  USSR).  A considerable propor-
tion of the vehicles manufactured are exported, 
although  the  percentages  involved  are  dimin-
ishing  (34· 7 o/o  in  1970,  but  only  27 ·4  o/o  in 
1980), mainly to West European markets. 
The  impact of this  boom  on the  Community 
industry should be assessed in relation to: 
•  the role of the State in the Eastern bloc coun-
tries:  foreign  currency  requirements  have  a 
direct  influence on the  quantity and prices  of 
vehicles for export; 
•  the features of the end-product, which - as 
it is manufactured under licence - bears direct 
comparison  with  the  West  European  models. 
Furthermore, the cars produced are at the lower 
end of the range and are intended for a public 
which is very sensitive to selling prices, and this 
is the main factor in their competitiveness. 
Commercially speaking, East-West  transfers of 
automobile  technology  have  so  far  enabled 
West  European  producers,  at  the  price  of a 
slight  increase  in  competition  on  the  Com-
munity market: 
•  to export factories  and knowhow to markets 
which  are  tightly  sealed  where  finished  prod-
ucts are concerned; 
•  to obtain low-price vehicles and components 
under  buy-back  deals:  Fiat,  for  example,  has 
undertaken to buy 820 000 engines, 50 000 vehi-
cles  and various subassemblies over 7 years  in 
exchange for building two factories in Poland. 
35.  However,  an  analysis  of recent trends  in 
East-West  industrial  cooperation  in  the  auto-
mobile sector suggests  that the  impact on the 
Community  automobile  industry  is  likely  to 
increase.  Information in a memo recently pub-
lished  by  the  Development Committee of the 
Economic  Commission  for  Europe  indicates 
that since  1975  three factors have combined to 
produce a rapid increase in  automobile-linked 
trade with these countries: the increasing num-
ber  of contracts  between  Western  companies 
and Eastern bloc countries, the increasing num-
ber of buy-back deals  involving Western  part-
ners  and  the  increasing  size  of the  projects 
envisaged. 
In  addition,  whereas  the  first  cooperation 
agreements concluded focused to a large extent 
on the existing models and proven manufactur-
ing  processes  of Western  companies, some of 
the  more  recent  projects  involve  new  models 
which will  be  made exclusively by the  Eastern 
bloc partners using the most advanced technol-
ogy (e.g.  Citroen's agreement with  Romania to 
make  the  Oltcit  model  and  Fiat's  agreement 
with Poland concerning the Zero model). 
Two  reasons may  be  advanced to explain this 
development: 
•  Firms  in  the  countries  concerned  can  only 
meet the construction and quality standards of 
their  Western  partners  by  adopting  the  most 
recent  technologies  (this  factor  is  very  impor-
tant,  in  view  of the  development of buy-back 
deals). 
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to become competitive on the world markets so 
that an adequate proportion of their production 
can be earmarked for export. 
The  scale  of the  commercial  implications  of 
these  various  factors  is  difficult  to  assess,  but 
according to  certain estimates, deliveries  from 
East  European  firms  under  buy-back  agree-
ments might total between 2 and 3 000 million 
dollars  per annum  in  1982-83  or  thereabouts, 
compared with  500 million  dollars  per annum 
in  the  1970s.  It is  also  estimated  that  motor 
vehicle imports into the EEC from  Eastern bloc 
countries might rise from  160 000 units in  1979 
to around 500 000 units in 1985.1 
The integration of  countries that have 
applied for membership (Spain and 
Portugal) 
36.  The situation in these two countries is par-
ticularly important, as they will shortly be join-
ing  the  Community.  The  recent  changes  that 
have  occurred  in  their  respective  automobile 
industries  and  their  future  prospects  are 
obvious: gradual integration into the European 
production system. The growth of their produc-
tion and their impact on competition have been 
characterized by: 
•  The rapid expansion of their home markets: 
between 1969 and 1977 car ownership rates rose 
from  49  to  149  per  I 000  inhabitants in  Spain 
and from  37 to 85  per I 000 inhabitants in  Por-
tugal; 
•  the  decisive  importance  of  the  decisions 
taken by their respective governments with the 
aim of rapidly developing a local industry both 
for  assembly and for the manufacture of com-
ponents (the rate of local incorporation for the 
various manufacturers has  been set  at  50 o/o  in 
Spain), both to encourage the adjustment of the 
productive  apparatus  and  to  bring  about  a 
change  in  the  balance  of trade  by  restricting 
importsl  and  by  increasing  exports  (49 o/o  of 
Spanish production was exported in  1980 com-
pared with 6 · 9 o/o in 1970); 
•  the importance of the role played by subsidi-
aries  of multinational  corporations:  in  Spain, 
1  Estimates ranae from 300 000 to 800 000 units. 
2  There are  very  considerable customs and  tax  barriers  in 
Spain and quotas in Ponupl. 
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production is controlled by Seat (in which Fiat 
has  a  considerable  holding),  PSA  Peugeot-
Citroi!n  (Citroi!n  and  Chrysler),  Renault  and 
Ford; in Portugal, most motor vehicle activity is 
carried  out  by  companies  controlled  by  EEC 
firms. 
3 7.  The recent changes in the automobile situ-
ation  in  these two  countries  are  characterized 
by the following: 
•  Cautious  enforcement  of  new  legislation 
gradually opening up their domestic markets to 
imports: granting quotas for imports of vehicles 
already  assembled  in  Spain,  enlargement  of 
quotas in force in Portugal; 
•  Launching of restructuring plans to improve 
the competitiveness of the local industry; 
•  Stimulation of foreign  investment: It is  esti-
mated  that  carmakers  are  planning  to  invest 
3 800 million  dollars  in  Spain in  the  next  five 
years,  and  in  Portugal  two  big  Renault  and 
Ford  projects are  now  beina considered.  EEC 
firms  are  not  the  only  ones  involved  either, 
since Nissan recently took a 35 · 9 o/o  holdina in 
the capital of Motor Iberica in order to produce 
commercial vehicles in Spain as from  1982, and 
talks are now reported to be under way between 
the Spanish authorities and Japanese manufac-
turers  concerning  a  Japanese  holding  in  the 
capital of Seat. 
In this context, the impact of these two coun-
tries  on  the  European  industry's  competitive 
situation should be considered from  the point 
of view of the competitive potential which they 
may  bring  to  the  Community  industry  after 
integration rather than from  the point of view 
of the  short-term competition they  may  repre-
sent for certain manufacturers. 
The industrialization of  the developing 
countries 
(Latin America, South Korea and India, 
Africa) 
38.  At present, these countries account for less 
than 7 o/o of world production. 
The main factors determining their competitive 
impact where the  European automobile indus-
try is concerned are as follows: 
23 •  the  industrial  and  commercial  policies 
adopted  by  their  respective  governments  in 
favour  of their  expanding  home  markets  or 
their external outlets: 
•  the establishment strategies and the degree of 
autonomy of the major manufacturers on their 
markets: 
•  the  extent  of  the  technology  transfers  of 
which they are the recipients. 
The  competitiveness  of these  new  producers 
has  so  far  been  predominantly  influenced  by 
the role of the  major manufacturers, since the 
ability  to  make  vehicles  for  the  world  market 
depends, where these countries are  concerned, 
on the extent to which they can use the technol-
ogy and knowhow already developed in Japan, 
the United States and Europe. 
39.  However,  some  of these  countries  repre-
sent a growing risk for the European industry in 
terms of direct exports. A case in point is South 
Korea, which is  starting to sell  on the Western 
markets  very  competitive  cars  manufactured 
under very  favourable conditions characterized 
by: 
•  very low labour costs: 
•  the  use  of large  Japanese  components  and 
technology; 
•  European design and equipment. 
On the other hand, their import potential would 
seem to be very limited in view of the extremely 
restrictive  policies  pursued  by  their  govern-
ments:  imports of passenger cars  are  virtually 
prohibited  in  Brazil,  which  also  imposes  a 
250 %  customs  tariff  on  other  vehicles;  the 
mandatory rates of local  incorporation exceed 
60 % in Argentina and Korea, and the rate is as 
much  as  95 %  for  certain  types  of vehicle  in 
these countries. 
* 
An  assessment of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the Community automobile industry can be 
made on the basis of all these factors. 
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Strengths and weaknesses of 
the Community automobile 
industry 
40.  The Community automobile industry  has 
been - and still is - a pace-setting industry in 
the economy. Any analysis of its strengths and 
weaknesses  should  look  at  the  problem  from 
the four different angles outlined below: 
•  Over  the  last  few  decades,  the  automobile 
industry  has  been  a  focal point for  industrial 
development,  not  only  because  of  its  own 
growth but also because of its  ability to  carry 
along  a  wide  range  of basic  industries  in  its 
wake. In future, too, it can continue to play this 
role by providing impetus for the high-technol-
ogy industries. 
•  Today  the  Community's  position  as  the 
world's  leading  trading  power  in  this  field 
appears  to  be  in  jeopardy,  partly  because  its 
dominant position  on the  Community's  inter-
nal market has weakened and partly because its 
place on external markets has been eroded. 
•  Over and above the efforts  specifically con-
nected with  changes in competition, the Com-
munity automobile industry must carry on res-
toring its  overall  competitiveness.  In  this  con-
text it is clear that its  broad-based yet heteroge-
neous  and  fragmented  structure  conceals  a 
number of inherent weaknesses. 
•  Despite this  handicap, which  clearly  has  its 
roots  in  history,  the  European  automobile 
industry has  considerable potential for develop-
ment,  though  that  potential  can  only  be  ful-
filled  by  restructuring  the  industry,  rethinking 
the technology and reorganizing the  sales  net-
works. 
Focal point tor economic 
development In the Community 
41.  Over the  last  few  decades  the  impact  of 
motor  vehicles  on  economic  development  in 
the Community has gone far beyond the effects 
of activities  directly  involved  in  automobile 
production. 
Despite slackening market growth as a result of 
the factors outlined above, there are still  many 
reasons  to  expect  the  automobile  industry  to 
S.2/81 remain  one of the  focal  points  for  economic 
progress in the Community. 
However, the industry's contribution to econo-
mic  growth  must develop along the  lines  that 
are  best  for  the  Community  economy  as  a 
whole - its role of carrying along basic indus-
tries in its wake can gradually be extended into 
that of promoting high-technology industries. 
Carrying along basic industries 
42.  A  few  figures  will  help  demonstrate  the 
stimulating effect which the automobile indus-
try has on the Community's economy: 
some 20% of all steel and machine tools prod-
uced in the Community, together with 5% of all 
glass  and  roughly  I 5 %  of  alf  rubber,  are 
intended for the automobile industry; 
for  every  one job provided  by  the  car-makers 
themselves roughly two more are created earlier 
in the chain. 
Moreover,  in  spite of steady improvements  in 
productivity  over  the  last  few  years,  direct 
employment  in  the  industry  has  continued to 
rise  steadily,  reaching  almost  2 000 000,  or 
5 · 4%  of the  entire  industrial  workforce,  in 
1979. 
Naturally, this effect is  more than just a matter 
of figures (for instance, pressure from  the auto-
mobile industry Jed to increased sales of special 
steels and lightweight alloys at the expense of 
less  sophisticated  metals).  Nevertheless,  to 
date,  the  automobile  industry's  weight  as  a 
major  customer  for  the  basic  industries  has 
been  more  significant  than  any  qualitative 
improvements,  however  important  these  may 
have been. 
Driving force behind high-technology 
industries 
43.  The  technological  changes  called  for  by 
the  deteriorating  energy  situation  combined 
with  the  need to optimize production costs  in 
order to combat competition from abroad have 
provided  the  Community automobile  industry 
with  an  opportunity to  develop into the basic 
driving force behind the high-technology indus-
tries. 
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The  reasons  for  this  trend  have  already  been 
given.l What is important here is the effect that 
they have on the European industry and on its 
ability  to  harness  those  forces  in  an  effective 
development plan. 
The  technological  revolution  in  the  automobile 
industry will  affect both vehicle design and the 
manufacturing processes: 
•  From  the technical point of view,  European 
cars  are  already  closely  tailored  to  market 
requirements, and it is fair to say that European 
can-makers have the  most satisfactory product 
ranges,  both as  regards  quality and as  regards 
the  proportion  of their  products  which  meet 
market requirements. This is  why only minimal 
changes are required here-unlike the case of  the 
American  industry, which  will  have to  switch 
from  the  chassis/body concept to the  integral 
construction concept, from  rear-wheel  drive  to 
front-wheel  drive  and from  rigid  rear axles  to 
fully independent suspension. 
The  Community  industry  will  have  to  follow 
two main lines of approach as regards the prod-
ucts themselves - one towards lighter vehicles, 
using  new  materials,  and  the  other  towards 
improving performance through the application 
of very advanced electronic components. 
•  The main change in  the manufacturing pro-
cesses  is  automation,  which  is  not  as  wide-
spread  in  the  Community  as  it  is  in  Japan 
(mainly  because  the  equipment  used  is,  on 
average,  older).  This  will  entail  strengthening 
the production plant by the addition of indus-
trial robots and precision machine tools. 
The need for the European industry to assimilate 
these  changes  is  acknowledged  by  producers 
and  trade  unions  alike,  yet  at  first  sight  the 
prospects  in  Europe  do  not  appear to  be  as 
bright as in Japan. Japan is the world's leading 
producer of industrial robots and her car-mak-
ers  have maintained close ties with electronics 
companies  for  some  time  (e.g.  Toyota  with 
Toshiba and Nissan with  Hitachi). Although a 
few  similar  arrangements  have  been.  made  in 
the  EEC  over the  last  few  years,  both on  the 
part of car-makers (Renault-Bendix) and on the 
part  of  component  manufacturers  (Jaeger-
Matra), there is nevertheless ground to be made 
up. 
1  Pointl7. 
25 Three considerations should be borne in mind 
before making any assessment of the effect that 
developments  in  this  industry  might  have 
within  the Community, particularly as  regards 
employment: 
•  Automation and electronics do not affect the 
automobile  industry  alone,  they  concern  all 
manufacturing  industries.  Over  the  next  few 
years most jobs in industry will be provided by 
the  industries  manufacturing  the  requisite 
equipment (i.e.  industrial  robots,  microproces-
sors and precision machine tools), whereas less 
labour  will  be  required  for  the  final  product 
and quality will improve. 
•  The  impact that  changes  iq  the• automobile 
industry will  have on employment can only be 
gauged by considering the overall ,ffect on all 
industries  concerned.  Japan  is  an  interesting 
example  in  this  respect,  since  it  has  already 
seen  a  large  proportion  of its' workforce  drift 
away  from  the  automobile  industry  !and 
towards  robot  production  and  maintenance 
million for Japan, the industry's second highest 
exporter  in  terms  of  value.t  The  European 
industry's strength in this sector is such that the 
Community  can  pay  roughly  20 o/o  of its  oil 
import bill from its trading surplus in cars. 
However,  it  is  clear from  trends  over the  last 
few  years that the trading position of the Com-
munity  automobile  industry  is  threatened  on 
two  fronts  - the  dominant position of Euro-
pean  car-makers  on  the  internal  market  has 
weakened and their position on external  mar-
kets has been eroded. 
Weakening of  position on the 
Community market 
45.  The  increase  in  Japanese  car-makers' 
share of the Community market is  the clearest 
pointer to this deterioration.2 
Japanese penetration of the Community market 
rose as follows between 1970 and 1980: 
Table I-Japanese penetration of  Community market, 1970 to 1980 
1970 
1980 
D 
0·1 
10·3 
0·2 
3·1 
0·02 
0·1 
0·4 
11·9 
S·O 
24·6 
activities.  However,  this  took  place  in  an 
extremely favourable economic climate. 
•  The  fundamental  question  concerns  the 
promotion  of the  high-technology  industries. 
This is where motor vehicles can make a crucial 
contribution, by opening up large enough mar-
kets to allow rapid and, more important, stra-
tegic development of these industries. 
At  all  events this  is  the only way  to maintain 
the competitiveness of the Community automo-
bile industry, the key to the Community's trad-
ing power. 
A major trading power, but at risk 
44.  In  1979  motor vehicles  worth  over  USD 
23 000  million  were  exported  from  the  Com-
munity,  as  against  slightly  over  USD  18 000 
26 
3·2 
26·2 
0·4 
29·5 
0 
30·5 
14·6 
42 
EEC 
0·6 
8·9 
Japanese car sales in the Community rose from 
48 400  units  in  1970  to over 754 000  in  1980. 
Naturally, Japanese car-makers' edge in terms 
of production costsl is the main reason for their 
success  on  the  Community  and  international 
markets. 
Erosion of  position on external markets 
46.  Community exports of passenger cars  to 
non-member countries fell  from 2 458 000 units 
in  1970  to  I 899 000  units  in  1980  (down  by 
23 %),  whereas over the same period world car 
exports  rose  by  almost  77 %,  from  approxi-
mately  4 · 8 million  units  to  just  short  of 
8 · 5 million,  and Japanese exports  shot up by 
426 o/o  from  roughly  700 000  to  over  3. 8 mil-
lion.4 
1  Annex 2:  Expons of passenaer cars,  commercial  vehicles 
and spare pans. 
2  Annex 9: (passenger c:ars and commercial vehicles). 
3  Points 23  "s~q. 
•  Annexes I, 3. 8 and 10. 
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Community manufacturers  constructing plants 
in  the  USA  and certain  Latin  American  and 
African  countries,  since  the  Japanese  compa-
nies'  share  of the  market  has  risen  sharply  in 
those three areas of the globe as  well,  particu-
larly between  1969 and  1979 when it increased 
from  5 o/o  to  II o/o  in  Latin  America  and from 
15 o/o to 3  5 o/o in Africa. 
The  North  American  market  is  a  particularly 
telling example.  Between  1970 and  1980 Com-
munity  exports  to  North  America  fell  by 
43S 000  units,  while  only  250 000  more  Euro-
pean cars were produced on the spot (by Volks-
wagen), and Japanese sales to the USA rose by 
over I· 5 million units, to take Japan's share of 
the market from 4 o/o to 21  o/o. 
The Community automobile industry's loss  of 
exports ultimately results in a loss of earnings. 
If the  Community  had  been  able  to  hold  its 
share of world  trade  in  motor  vehicles  at  the 
1970  level  - over  51  o/o  of all  exports  - it 
would have sold about 4 · 3 million cars in  1980, 
2 · 4 million  more  than  at  present.  Given  the 
average productivity of the industry (including 
components) in  1979,1  that would be  the equi-
valent of approximately 400 000 jobs. 
Prospects 
47.  All  the  analyses  agree  that  the  current 
trend can be expected to continue at least until 
1985. This would mean an increase in  imports 
of motor vehicles in Western Europe in general 
and  in  the  Community  in  particular,  and  a 
reduction in Community exports of assembled 
cars. 
Together these two phenomena will bring about 
a  gradual  deterioration  in  the  Community's 
trade  in  passenger cars.  Some  studies  sugest 
that  Europe  could  be  a  net  importer of cars 
from  1983  onwards,  whereas  other  scenarios 
predict that the Community's  net exports  will 
fall  from  their  present  level  of approximately 
550 000 units to below 300 000 in 1985. 
These  forecasts  are  based  on  a  number  of 
factors: 
- continuation of  the Japanese pressure; 
1  Approxima1ely six vehicles per man per year. 
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- development  of plants  outside  the  Com-
munity; 
- restructuring  of  the  American  industry, 
which will stop importing small models such as 
the Ford Fiesta from its European subsidiaries; 
- increased imports from  the Comecon coun-
tries and a number of other sources (especially 
Korea and Brazil). 
The  prospects are  brighter as  regards  trade in 
components, thouah it is difficult to analyse the 
situation, particularly since American compan-
ies are plannina to sell large quantities to their 
European subsidiaries.1 
48.  All these factors, coupled with the forego-
ing  analyses  of the  transformation  which  the 
automobile  industry  is  cun;ently  underaoing 
and  of the  chansing  pattern  of competition, 
sugest that  the  Community's  motor  vehicle 
trade should be looked at in the terms set out 
below: 
•  The trend towards trade in components sup-
planting  trade  in  assembled  cars  is  likely  to 
continue, partly for the industrial and technical 
reasons already aiven and partly as a result of 
changes in economic policy towards imports of 
motor vehicles. What is more, as regards prices, 
it will take time for the Community to regain its 
strength as an exporter, and in the meantime its 
competitors will  keep up their pressure on the 
Community market and in  non-member coun-
tries; 
•  Large  new  export  markets  will  gradually 
open for spare parts, motor vehicle production 
plant (in particular industrial robots) and tech-
nology and knowhow. 
It is  important to realize that this is  a positive 
development in that these areas account for a 
growing  proportion  of  the  final  product's 
value-added and that an international division 
of labour where trade is not limited to finished 
products alone would make for greater stability. 
If different  stages  of production  were  carried 
out in different countries, the trade flows would 
be based on industrial interests in  addition to 
purely commercial interests. 
At  any event the future role of the automobile 
industry in the defence of the Community's for-
1  Poinl30. 
17 eign  trade  will  depend  on  its  ability  to  grasp 
these opportunities. 
A wide Industrial base, but made 
up of many small parts 
49.  Comparison  of the  Community's  motor 
vehicle  industry  with  its  Japanese  and  North 
American  competitors gives  a  vivid  picture of 
the  relationship  between  the  size  of the  mar-
kets,  the homogeneity of the environment and 
industrial structures. 
The motor vehicle industry is  the  predominant 
industry in  the  four  largest  Community coun-
tries, and the European automobile industry is, 
above  all,  a  patchwork  of national  industries 
which: 
•  individually, have a comparable structure to 
the Japanese and American  industries, though 
their market is much smaller: 
•  collectively, share the world's largest market 
for  motor  vehicles,  though  structurally  they 
have not yet fully adapted to that situation. 
A more detailed analysis of motor vehicle pro-
duction in the Community shows that although 
the Community is the world's leading producer, 
its automobile industry is heterogeneous in res-
pect of production and the components indus-
try is fragmented in a way which is bad for it. 
The automobile industry: 
A heterogeneous whole 
50.  Compared  with  its  Japanese and Ameri-
can  competitors,  the  European  automobile 
industry presents a heterogeneous picture with 
the following salient features: 
Diversity of  the situation of  the  firms as 
regards: 
industrial  options - American  and Japanese 
companies  face  direct  competition  on  their 
home  markets, whereas  various  European car-
makers (e.g. BMW, Daimler-Benz, Alfa Romeo) 
have specialized in particular 'slots' of the mar-
ket; 
relations with  companies in  other countries -
there  are  no  car  plants  owned  by  non-Jap-
anese car-makers in  Japan, and Volkswagen  is 
the  only  European  company  currently  manu-
facturing motor vehicles in the USA, yet almost 
a quarter of all  cars  produced in  Europe from 
l8 
the European subsidiaries of Ford and General 
Motors, which are now to be incorporated more 
fully in their parent company's plans;1 
relations with the public authorities which exer-
cise direct control over certain companies in the 
Community (e.g. British Leyland and Renault); 
finally,  the  scale  of operations  and  financial 
situation - although there are wide differences 
in  the size  of the various Japanese companies 
and market disparities in the financial situation 
of  the  individual  American  producers,  both 
phenomena exist side by side within the Com-
munity; 
Smaller degree of  concentration 
In  the  USA  and Japan,  the  two  leading  pro-
ducers  control  roughly  75%  of the  domestic 
market,  whereas  in  the  Community  the  same 
share of the market is  split up between the top 
five  companies.  This  situation  clearly  has  its 
roots in  history, when  production was concen-
trated along national lines. 
As a result, although a number of groups within 
the Community have now reached a size which 
places them in  the world's top ten  in  terms of 
annual  production,  their  operations  neverthe-
less remain on a much smaller scale than those 
of the two leading American producers, as can 
be seen from Table 2. 
Table 2- World's top ten car-makers. 1979 
I.  General Motors 
2.  Ford Motors 
3.  Toyota 
4.  Nissan 
5.  Volkswagen-Audi 
6.  Peugeot-Citrol!n -Talbot 
7.  Renault-Saviem-Berliet 
8.  Fiat-Autobianchi -
Lancia-OM 
9.  Chrysler Corp. 
I  0.  Toyo Kogyo 
II.  Mitsubishi 
12.  Honda 
13.  British Leyland 
14.  Daimler-Benz 
IS.  Isuzu 
Soun:o:  L'Araus. 
'  Points 29 et stq. 
8 533 742 
5 230 383 
2 996 225 
2 704 544 
2 530 565 
2 425 798 
I 945 289 
I 542 163 
I 429 082 
971421 
938 517 
801  869 
657 637 
604 859 
424 788 
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all  vehicles  produced  by  the  companies  con-
cerned  (both  passenger  cars  and  commercial 
vehicles): 
the  production  figures  for  all  their  branches 
abroad, excluding plants in State-trading coun-
tries, since such plants cannot be considered as 
branches (e.g.  Lada and  Polski  in  the  case of 
Fiat). The very  names of the firms listed in the 
table  betray  one of the  weakness  from  which 
the European industry still suffers in relation to 
its competitors - the complexity and cumber-
some nature of its production structures. 
Japanese  and  North  American  groups  have 
developed mainly through internal growth, i.e. 
by  investment  in  expanding  existing  com-
panies, whereas the European groups have had 
to turn mainly to external growth, i.e. financial 
mergers, in order to attain a scale of production 
in keeping with the expanding markets. 
Inevitably,  concentration  of this  type  over  a 
relatively  short  period  gives  rise  to  extremely 
cumbersome structures. Before the full  benefits 
of scale can be felt, far-reaching harmonization 
is  required,  a  task  which  is  rendered  all  the 
more  difficult  as  the  economic  situation 
becomes more tense. 
Three  Community  car-makers  are  affected  in 
particular - though there are wide differences 
in their financial situations: Peugeot - Citroen 
- Talbot,  Fiat  and  British  Leyland.  At  the 
opposite end of the scale Renault and Volkswa-
gen benefit from a more rational internal organ-
ization. 
Bearing  in  mind  the  effects  of economies  of 
scale described above,  it  can  be  seen  that the 
length of runs is a more significant factor in the 
production of components than in the range of 
models  produced.  Engines  are  normally  pro-
duced by the car-makers themselves and offer a 
prime  example  of  the  current  disparities 
between  European  producers.  A recent  report 
showed that there was  a ratio of I :10  between 
- at the lower end of the scale - the annual 
production of BL, which fits most of its models 
with  different  engines  and therefore  produces 
only extremely limited series (say, 60 000 units 
per year), and - at the top end - VW,  where 
far-reaching standardization has made it possi-
ble to produce series of  635 000 units per year. 
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For the  car-makers standardization of compo-
nents is a question of internal organization and, 
in  some cases, cooperation with other compa-
nies, but it  should also be tackled by the spe-
cialist producers scattered throughout the Com-
munity. 
Production of  components: 
Damaging fragmentation 
51.  The Community's car components indus-
try is  much less concentrated than its Japanese 
and American  counterparts, not only  in  terms 
of the number of companies but also in  terms 
of the specialization of the  individual  compa-
nies and of the standardization of production. 
A comparative study drawn up at the Commis-
sion's request showed that: 
•  there  are  in  Japan 350 companies supplying 
components to the Japanese automobile manu-
facturers, whereas in Europe there are I 750: 
•  on the whole Japanese companies are larger, 
some 85 % of them having a workforce of over 
100,  as  compared  with  less  than  60% in  this 
category  in  the  FR of Germany  and approxi-
mately 40 % in France; 
•  although  the  studies  are  not  unanimous  on 
this  subject,  labour  productivity  in  the  Com-
munity car components industry appears to be 
lower than in Japan; one should, however, also 
take into account the fact that recourse to sub-
contractors is greater in that country than in the 
Community: 
•  the scale of production gives Japanese com-
panies additional advantages over Community 
producers  and  Japanese  manufacturers  share 
equipment more often. 
Behind  these  facts  lie  profound  differences 
between the organization of the Community car 
components  industry  and that of its  competi-
tors,  particularly  as  regards  the  relationship 
between  car-makers  and component manufac-
turers. 
In  the  United  States  of America  and,  more 
important, in Japan a large number of compo-
nent manufacturers are  under the  financial  or 
commercial  control  of  the  automobile  pro-
ducers (in Japan 83 % of all  components were 
supplied as  original equipment), but the situa-
tion  is  the  reverse  in  the  Community,  where 
most component manufacturers are financially 
29 independent and where roughly 50% of all the 
components  produced  are  intended  for  the 
spare-parts market. 
Clearly  it  is  impossible  to  quantify the  effect 
that  these  organizational  differences  have  on 
the  competitiveness  of  the  companies  con-
cerned, since the differences bring both advan-
tages  (for  instance,  greater  competition)  and 
drawbacks  (limited  scope  for  economies  of 
scale). However, the Japanese industry seems to 
make better use of its distinctive structure than 
European companies. 
* 
This  brief analysis  leaves  no  doubt  that  the 
European  industry  has  much  more  scope  for 
improving  its  production  system  than  its 
Japanese  competitors,  where  operations  are 
more or less optimal. 
Conllderable room for 
Improvement 
52.  The  American  industry  has  launched  a 
large-scale  conversion  programme  entailing 
sweeping changes in its plant, and the Japanese 
production system is so perfectly organized that 
there can no longer be any hope of substantial 
gains through further improvement. This places 
the European automobile industry in  a  unique 
situation, since  it  is  in  Europe that the  cost/ 
benefit  ratio  for  the  measures  to  be  taken  is 
probably highest. 
There is  still very wide scope for improvement, 
not only through the rationalization of its  pro-
duction apparatus but also through the applica-
tion  of  European  technical  knowhow  and 
improvement of the distribution networks. 
Rationalization of  plant 
53.  The only means of assessing the efficiency 
of industrial  plant are  the  productivity figures 
ant the unit production costs, the basic indica-
tors of firms' competitiveness. 
However,  it  is  difficult  to  draw  comparisons 
between  industries, not only because of struc-
30 
tural differences in the appara_tus of production 
of each industry but also because of the differ-
ent economic and social environments in which 
they  operate.  For example, in  any  analysis of 
the extent and type of improvements that could 
be made in the Community's industry it  must 
be remembered that the Japanese industry oper-
ates in an extremely propitious social climate. 
Table 3 gives a general comparison of produc-
tion  and  employment in  the  Community,  US 
and Japanese automobile industries. 
Table 3 - Production and employment 
Community 
(1979) 
Vehicles 
produced  II 487 
Workforce  I 953 
Sourrrs:  Community: Eurolllat; 
USA: DOT report; 
USA 
(1979) 
11480 
2 200 
(/ 000) 
Ja~n 
(I  78) 
9 269 
665 
Japan:  Daiwa  Securities  report  (The  Japanese  Automobile 
Industry 1980). 
The  production  liaurca  include all  pauenaer can and  industrial and 
commercial vehicles. 
The employment liaures cover all direct employment with car-makers 
and component manufacturers. 
Although  all  these  figures  were  drawn  from 
similar sources, a  measure of caution is  never-
theless called for when interpreting them since: 
•  different ranges of vehicles are  produced in 
the  three  different  geographical  regions:  the 
Community and  USA  each  produce  approxi-
mately  500 000  heavy  goods  vehicles  per 
annum whereas Japan produces only approxi-
mately 150 000: 
•  the figures  for the Community and the USA 
do not take full account of components, since a 
large  proportion of the components produced 
are intended for the spare-parts market; 
•  the complexity of subcontracting means that 
it  is  hard to say exactly how  many people are 
employed, particularly in the case of Japan. 
However,  the  Japanese  industry's  higher  pro-
ductivity cannot entirely be put down to these 
differences.  A  detailed  analysis  by  a  major 
American  automobile  manufacturer  made  a 
direct  comparison  of production  units  which 
confirmed this gap and concluded as follows: 
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Productivity  at  even  the  most  efficient  Euro-
pean plants is one-third that of Japanese plants. 
For example,  a  Toyota  assembly  plant would 
only employ one person  per vehicle  produced 
per day, as against three in the FR of Germany 
and six in the United Kingdom; 
As regards the production of  components 
Here too there is  a wide gap, with Toyota pro-
ducing  nine  engines  per  person  per  day  as 
against  only  two  in  a  comparable  production 
unit in the United Kingdom. 
These differences stem from  the more extensive 
automation and higher rate of plant utilization 
in Japan. 
This  explains  why  production  costs  are  still 
much lower in Japan despite the fact that wages 
there are catching up with those in  Europe and 
the USA. 1 
The  analysis  must  also  take  account  of two 
other factors namely: 
•  per capita wage  costs  for  Japanese  automo-
bile  manufacturers  in  the  strict  sense  of the 
word are  now  higher than those for  European 
producers; 
•  nevertheless, the average hourly costs for the 
industry (including components) are still much 
lower in Japan, as the table in Annex 6 shows. 
Finally,  all  these  factors  combined  with  the 
aforementioned  structural  developments  as 
regards  plant  in  the  Community  automobile 
industry make it clear that the industry's ability 
to  rationalize  its  apparatus of production  will 
require: 
•  Improvements  in  the  industry's  internal 
organization  - this  is  probably  where  the 
greatest progress can be made; 
1  Produc:tion costs 20 'Yo  to 30 'Yo  lower than in the FR of Ger-
many and France and USD  I 000 to I SOO  lower than in the 
USA (points 2S-27). 
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•  more efficient plant use - this depends to a 
large extent on cooperation between both sides 
of industry; 
•  putting the emphasis on automation -this is 
directly  influenced  by  the  individual  firm's 
financial capacity. 
It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  divide  the 
Japanese industry's advantages over the Com-
munity industry into two categories - one for 
which  compensatory action  can  be  taken  and 
another where the nature of the economy pre-
cludes  such  action.  However,  given  the  wide 
scope for structural improvements directly open 
to the European automobile industry, the 'non-
transferable' aspects seem to be of only second-
ary importance in the current state of affairs, all 
the more so since production costs are only one 
of the factors affecting competitiveness. 
Application of  technical knowhow 
54.  The Community's automobile technology 
is unparalleled, not only as regards the products 
themselves  but also  in  relation  to  the  produc-
tion  methods  employed.  Accordingly,  the 
Japanese industy based its expansion on Euro-
pean technology, and American manufacturers 
will  also  depend  heavily  on  Europe  in  their 
redeployment programme. 
However, the technical expertise  which  allows 
European car-makers to build the best cars: 
•  has lost some of its lead over foreign - and 
in  particular  Japanese  - industries,  where 
extensive  research  and development work  has 
been carried out. A recent report by the French 
Commissariat  au  Plan  revealed  that  research 
and development  costs  account  for  well  over 
10% of all  expenditure by  the Japanese auto-
mobile industry, whereas it  has slumped below 
that level in the Community; 
•  is  scattered  over  a  large  number of compa-
nies; 
•  does not appear to have been put to the best 
use, as can be seen from  the two examples de-
scribed below; 
31 Production methods 
Some  European  motor  vehicle  manufacturers 
lead the field in industrial robot technology, yet 
do not  produce  sufficiently  long  runs  to  give 
production  costs  which  bear comparison  with 
those of their Japanese competitors;  1 
Products 
Systems  allowing substantial  improvements  in 
the behaviour of vehicles are available in only a 
small  proportion  of the  vehicles  produced  in 
Europe (e.g. antilock braking system, ABS). 
Exploitation  of Europe's  automobile  technol-
ogy  rescources  can therefore be seen  as  a  key 
factor  in  any  bid  to  improve  the  competitive-
ness of the industry. However, it will involve: 
•  breaking down the  divisons  between  R & D 
operations and extending R &  D agreements -
the  Joint  Research  Committee  set  up  by 
Renault,  British  Leyland,  Fiat,  PSA,  Volks-
wagen  and  Volvo  is  one  noteworthy  effort  in 
this direction: 
•  speeding up the application of technological 
advances in industrial processes and in  the end 
products. 
Making the best use of  distribution 
networks 
55.  The  paper presented  by  the  Commission 
last  October  drew  attention  to  the  economic 
and strategic importance of the distribution and 
maintenance networks.2 
The are  roughly 500 000  firms  engaged  in  the 
sale  and  maintenance  of  motor  vehicles  in 
Europe,  with  an  estimated  total  workforce  of 
2 900 000. Japan and the USA have a workforce 
of 656 000  and 2 600 000  respectively,  though, 
of course, the economic and geographical size 
of the  markets  should  be  taken into consider-
ation. The  fact  that motor vehicle  distribution 
1  The average price for an industrial robot in  Europe in  1979 
was FF 450 000 as against FF 250 000 in Japan. 
2  Bull. EC  10-1980, point2.3.19. 
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networks  in  the  Community  are  particularly 
dense  is  obviously  a  powerful  weapon  in  the 
fight against competition from abroad. 
Since European motor vehicle distribution net-
works are directly affected by  any restructuring 
carried  out by  the  producers (as  can  be  seem 
from  the reorganization of the Talbot network, 
for example), they would probably benefit from 
a strengthening of their ties  with  the manufac-
turers. The chief benefits would be: 
•  an  improvement  in  supply's  responsiveness 
to demand - Japanese companies  use  highly 
advanced  computerized  methods  to  detect 
changes  in  customer  preference  patterns  and 
adapt their products accordingly as  quickly as 
possible: 
•  provision,  in  optimum  conditions,  for  the 
equipment which has to be installed in keeping 
with  the  latest  improvements  in  methods  of 
inspecting and controlling motor vehicles. 
Finally,  distribution  networks  abroad also  fall 
to be discussed, since they determine the effec-
tiveness  of  any  external  development  and 
export  policy.  The  basic  problem  is  that  it  is 
difficult  for  many  European  manufacturers  to 
bear the cost of setting up networks of this sort 
by  themselves.  The  most  likely  solution  is  for 
manufacturers  to  combine  their  efforts  in  the 
fashion of the recent Peugeot-Fiat agreement in 
Latin America. 
56.  This  analysis  of the  changing conditions 
as regards international competition and of the 
strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  European 
automobile  industry  gives  some  idea  of the 
extent and nature of the changes with which it 
is confronted.  · 
Clearly, over and above the cyclical  problems 
arising from the general decline in demand, the 
structural adjustments already undertaken must 
be pursued and reinforced. 
Naturally,  it  is  the  companies themselves that 
are  most  directly  affected.  Nevertheless  all 
economic operators with  an interest in, or res-
ponsible  for,  ensuring  that  this  industry  runs 
smoothly should do all that they can to encour-
age its development. 
Against  this  background,  it  is  important  to 
assess the effects that these changes in the auto-
mobile industry might have on the work of the 
various bodies concerned. 
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A look at the future 
57.  ·The  basic  information  required  for  any 
such assessment, which, of course, includes the 
Commission's programmes and the main objec-
tives  thereof,  will  be  provided by  the  analysis 
- in Part Two of this paper - of the following 
topics: 
•  adaptation of production structures as  a pre-
requisite for any improvements in the competi-
tiveness of the industry: 
•  liveliness of the home market, which must be 
exploited  in  order to  create  a  favourable  cli-
mate for companies; 
•  development  of  international  equilibria 
within  which  the  Community  automobile 
industry must seek to maintain its position. 
Reorganizing production 
58.  Reorganization of production in the Com-
munity's automobile industry  will  have  indus-
trial,  financial,  technological,  regional  and 
social  implications.  A  look  at  these  various 
implications shows what complex changes will 
have to be made, although it  also emerges that 
those responsible for  taking the economic and 
social  decisions  broadly  agree  on  what  forms 
they should take. It is, of course, up to the firms 
to take the initiative as regards the decisions to 
be made, but they should be given an environ-
ment  which  is  favourable  to  the  implementa-
tion of these decisions. 
Industrial edjuatments 
59.  As  far  as  the  industry  is  concerned,  the 
two  most  important matters for  discussion  are 
the development of cooperation and mergers in 
the industry and public intervention. 
Mergers, cooperation and competition 
60.  The  fact  that  production  in  the  automo-
bile  industry  has  become  increasingly  frag-
mented, in spite of numerous attempts to amal-
gamate  and  reorganize  over  the  last  fifteen 
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years, means that the industry will have to con-
tinue along this same course and in many cases 
start  to  think  in  Community  rather  than 
national terms, particularly as far as component 
manufacture is  concerned.  This  is,  in  the  first 
instance,  the  industry's  responsibility,  and  is 
the only way of taking advantage of economies 
of scale and of setting up groupings which can 
compete  at  international  level,  which  is  what 
the industry is after. 
Cooperation  between  European  companies 
would thus seem to be  the best way of achiev-
ing these aims at present.l 
61.  In  this  respect,  the  Commission  has  a 
special role to play because of the responsibili-
ties in the field of competition assigned to it by 
the Treaties. 
In  applying the  Community competition rules 
in the motor vehicle sector, the Commission has 
sought  to  ensure the  maintenance of effective 
competition within the common market, and in 
doing so has taken into account the actual and 
potential effect of competition from outside the 
common market.  Examination of the competi-
tive conditions faced by Community manufac-
turers, particularly the changes over a period in 
their  Community  market  shares,  shows  that 
despite its oligopolistic structure and the coop-
erative  links  already  established,  the  motor 
vehicles market is the scene of effective compe-
tition. This appreciation of the present competi-
tive situation is based on the fact that the com-
mon  market, closely  integrated  into the  world 
market by  the effective application of the prin-
ciple  of free  trade  in  manufactures,  remains 
open,  and  that  neither  imports  nor  potential 
imports are excluded by protectionist measures. 
Structural considerations 
62.  The Commission has the power to forbid 
an abusive reinforcement, by  concentration, of 
a  dominant  position  held  by  one  or  more 
undertakings.2 
1  This cooperation is in fact encouraged by the European Par-
liament  in  para. 24  of its  resolution of  13 January  1981  (OJ 
C 28.  9.  2.  1981) and by  the European  Metalworkers Federa-
tion. 
2  Article 86 of the EEC Treaty; the Cortlintrtlal Cart doctrine. 
based on a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. 
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largest  European  manufacturers  of cars  and 
commercial vehicles and of the European sub-
sidiaries of the two North American groups per-
mits the conclusion that no manufacturer has as 
yet  achieved such a  dominant position  within 
the common market. 
The  maintenance  of a  balanced,  competitive 
oligopoly  implies  the  necessity  of preventing 
abusive reinforcements of dominant positions, 
which  would remove from  the market the bal-
ancing force  which is  indispensable to the free 
play  of effective  competition;  it  is,  however, 
impossible to lay  down  in advance and in the 
abstract  the  size  which  a  single  undertaking 
should not exceed, or what constitutes a suffi-
cient number of  competitors. 
With  regard  to  components  and  accessories, 
production and distribution structures are  very 
different.  Certainly  there  remains  some  scope 
for  concentration moves  which  could improve 
undertakings' competitiveness. But the markets 
for certain parts have already reached a level of 
concentration so high that a horizontal concen-
tration concerning them,  or a  vertical  concen-
tration with  major vehicle manufacturers could 
be caught by the prohibition of certain concen-
trations. Previous analyses have shown that the 
adjustments to be made in the manufacture of 
components  chiefly  concern  those  where  pro-
duction on a  continent-wide scale has  not yet 
been  achieved  and  those  whose  production 
needs to be improved because of technical pro-
gress. 
Agreements 
63.  In addition, the Commission exercises the 
power  of forbidding  agreements  which  limit 
competition in the common market and author-
izing cooperation which brings advantages both 
for  the  productivity  of undertakings  and  for 
consumers.• 
Until now, cooperation agreements concerning 
research, development and larger-scale produc-
tion of components necessary for vehicle man-
ufacture  have  always  been  accepted  by  the 
Commission, in view in particular of the ration-
1  Anicle 85 of I he EEC Treaty. 
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alization  benefits  which  result.  Cooperation 
agreements  of this  kind  should  not  pose  any 
major  problem  under  Article 85,  especially 
where they do not concern components whose 
cost would be a significant element in the price 
of the end product. 
Cooperation  at  end-product  level,  i.e.  in  the 
actual manufacture of certain vehicles, has also 
been  approved.  The  Commission  must,  how-
ever, examine closely the possible risks of mar-
ket-sharing  which  some  examples  of coopera-
tion in this field may entail. 
64.  The competitive functioning of the distri-
bution trade is an important element of compe-
tition  in  the  motor  vehicle  sector  within  the 
common  market.  The  Commission  recognizes 
the  manufacturers's  rights  to  set  up  networks 
based  on  the  selection  of dealers,  which  has 
enabled sales systems appropriate to  the prod-
ucts  to  be established.  In this  way,  the manu-
facturers' ability effectively to use their special-
ized sales networks as necessary to defend their 
market positions is  guaranteed in  law.  Experi-
ence makes it possible to contemplate the early 
adoption of a regulation giving a block exemp-
tion to distribution agreements applied, in  cir-
cumstances  which  are  equitable  towards  the 
various interests concerned, in the motor indus-
try.  Because of the importance of maintaining 
effective competition in the oligopolistic motor 
vehicles  market,  the  Commission  must  ensure 
that the  sales  networks of the  major manufac-
turers  remain  independent,  and  in  particular 
that price competition in  trade between  Mem-
ber States is not eliminated. 
These  considerations  together  show  that  the 
wishes  expressed  by  the  European  Parliament 
as regards the safeguarding of competition and 
the  need  for  increased cooperation  within  the 
Community motor vehicle industry, stressed in 
its opinions as a whole, are quite compatible. 
It  should,  however,  be  noted  that  efforts 
towards  cooperation  should not  be  limited  to 
the vehicle sector in the strict sense of the term, 
but should also  extend to  links  with  the  elec-
tronics and industrial plant industries.  In view 
of the strategic nature of these two sectors and 
of the  breadth  of their  markets  in  the  Com-
munity,  the  question  of  concentrations  and 
agreements  at  European  level  in  these  two 
fields should indeed be examined carefully. 
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65.  Nowadays,  public  intervention  in  the 
automobile industry is a general phenomenon: 
in  Japan, where  the  industry  originally  devel-
oped  in  a  closed  market  spurred  on  by  the 
MITJI  and with  the help of tax and financial 
concessions  - and  is  still  the  subject  of an 
attentive industrial policy ;2 
in the USA, where the Federal Government res-
cued the Chrysler Group by guaranteeing loans 
and  where  a  deregulation  programme  has 
recently been implemented;l 
in  most  European  countries,  where  govern-
ments support their motor manufacturers in dif-
ferent ways and to different degrees. 
Measures taken by the Japanese authorities in 
this respect seem have been extremely effective 
althouah their level  of support was  no  higher 
than in  some other countries.  In  the  USA,  the 
debate  about  federal  financial  aid  to  certain 
manufacturers still goes on. In the Community, 
discussions are focusing on the effect of public 
intervention policies on the structural reorgani-
zation of  the automobile industry. 
66.  This concern is expressed in the European 
Parliament resolution which,  in  para. S,  insists 
on the  need  for  'the coordination of national 
aid schmes'. The  European Metalworkers Fed-
eration  would  like  an  investment  notification 
scheme  to  be  set  up  at  national  and  Com-
munity level  and public subsidies to the auto-
mobile  industry to be  harmonized on a  Com-
munity scale. 
These requests seem all the more well-founded 
as the growth forecasts made by the automobile 
industry  in  general  clearly  show  up  a  slower 
development in which replacement could con-
stitute the essential  part of the future  demand 
on the traditional  markets.  In  such  a perspec-
tive  the  inapposite  use  of  public  resources 
could lead to the risk of creating overcapacity 
with reaard to which the temptation to remedy 
by  the search  for  protectionist measures  or by 
the  granting  of new  reorientation  aids  would 
exist. 
•  Ministry of International Trade and Industry. 
2  Point 23. 
3  Point31. 
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The possibility of such public incentives should 
rather be contemplated with the aim of improv-
ing  the  competitiveness  of  the  automobile 
industry, in particular by the reoraanization and 
the increase of the content of the value-added 
by the firms. 
67.  In  general,  the  need  to  restructure  and 
modernize  the  automobile  industry  and  the 
special competitive situation prevailina on the 
market should be taken into consideration: 
by the Member States, when granting State aid 
to certain firms.  In this respect, the factors to be 
tak~n  into  account  by  the  Member  States 
should  not  be  based  exclusively  on  national 
considerations but should take into account the 
possible effect of this aid on the situation in the 
Community  industry  as  a  whole.  Takina  the 
Community context  into  account  in  this  way 
should make it possible to achieve consistency 
and  avoid  the  risk  of  one-upmanship  and 
expensive wastage from the point of view of the 
common interest; 
by  the  Commission,  which  is  responsible  for 
ensurina compliance with the rules on State aid 
unter Articles 92  et seq. of the EEC Treaty.  In 
doing  so,  the  Commission  can  include in  its 
assessment,  subject  to  certain  conditions  and 
under  the  discretionary  powers  which  it  has 
pursuant to Article 92 (3), certain aspects of the 
special  competitive  situation  existina  on  the 
world automobile market. In the points of view 
that  it  has  expressed,  the  Commission  has 
accourdinaly  already  taken  account  of Com-
munity priorities in  various  areas (eneray sav-
ina,  pollution  control,  reaional  and  employ-
ment policy).  In addition, once the objectives 
have  been  set  and  the  requisite  adjustments 
have  been  recoanized,  resources  must  be 
deployed  in  order  to  carry  out  the  action 
involved. This is  one of the aspects which  will 
have  to  be  taken  into  consideration  when 
assessing State aids; it  may also  have  a direct 
bearing on the  allocation  of Community sup-
port. 
Such an overall approach to public intervention 
will entail careful consideration, in conjunction 
with the Member States, of the need for specific 
sectoral  measures  and possibly the criteria for 
using Community financial instruments. 
68.,  In this connection, the Commission could 
set up machinery for monitoring the aid granted 
to the automobile industry.  As  an appropriate measure  under  Article 93 (I)  the  Commission 
could ask the Member States to inform it, after 
the  fact,  of all  aid  granted  to  the  automobile 
industry,  whatever  its  origin  and  legal  basis. 
Such an  arrangement would  extend the  infor-
mation  available  to  the  Commission  beyond 
the types of aid of which it receives prior notifi-
cation  to  include  aid  granted  directly  by  the 
Member States in  the context of special agree-
ments with the Commission under the heading 
of regional or general aid schemes. This would 
obviously not prevent these types of aid being 
implemented, but would make for greater trans-
parency and enable the Commission to  assess 
the  overall  impact  of the  aid.  Where  appro-
priate, the Commission could activate preven-
tive  action, in  particular if it was  to  find  that 
this  aid  was  likely  to  aggravate  the  structural 
problems of the industry. 
By  contrast, an aid management system would 
seem to be inappropriate as long as the industry 
is not in a state of crisis, as already emphasized 
in point 15 of this paper. 
Financial matters 
69.  Considerable amounts of investment will 
be required in order to reorganize production in 
Europe's automobile industry, although not as 
much  as  will  have  to  be  invested  by  North 
American  manufacturers.  Moreover,  inevitably 
the climate will  not be nearly so favourable  as 
in the past. 
Some particularly important points have to  be 
considered  here;  not only the  amounts  which 
should be allocated and in what fields, but also 
the extent to which firms  can actually raise the 
money. 
Investment and financial capacity 
70.  The information available does not give a 
very clear indication because of the complexity 
of financial structures and because firms regard 
such information as confidential. 
Generally, the  position  can be  summarized as 
follows: 
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Investment projects 
American  manufacturers  expect  to  spend 
75 000 million dollars over the next five  years, 
although this is  for the retooling of production 
plants;1 
Japanese  manufacturers  will  be  investing 
12 000 million  dollars  at  home  over  the  next 
three  years,  although  their  plant  is  already 
extremely efficient ;2 
European manufacturers are planning to invest 
some 35 000 million dollars over the next three 
to five years (estimate). 
By  way  of comparison,  the  amounts  invested 
between 1970 and 1977 were as follows: 
the four leading American manufacturers spent 
less than 35 000 million dollars; 
the three leading Japanese manufacturers spent 
some 8 · 5 000 million dollars; 
the ten leading European manufacturers spent 
a little over 15 000 million dollars. 
Financing capacity 
Only the Japanese will  be able to release sur-
plus  financial  resources  over  the  next  few 
years; this is  already allowing them to begin to 
diversify to some extent. 
Although,  over  the  last  ten  years,  American 
manufacturers have been able to finance them-
selves  (average  self-financing  ratio  between 
1970  and  1977  was  around  170 %  ),  they  will 
now have to borrow heavily,  not only because 
of their  investment  plans,  but because  of the 
heavy  losses  they  have  been  making,  particu-
larly in  1980. 
European manufacturers were just beginning to 
restore  their overall  financial  capacity (with  a 
self-financing ratio of 110% between  1974 and 
1977  compared  with  85%  between  1970  and 
1973), but will probably have to start borrowing 
again more substantially. Their debt burden is 
still  high  compared  with  their competitors:  in 
1978,  the  long-term  indebtedness  of the  main 
Community groups  was  generally  20% higher 
1  Point30. 
2  Point 28. 
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figures of 4 · 8 % for General Motors and 0 · I % 
for Toyota. 
Under these circumstances, all  the institutions 
which  help  in  one  way  or another to  finance 
motor  industry  investment,  particularly  the 
Commission, which has contributed substantial 
amounts over the last few  years, should reflect 
on their policies. 
Community financing 
71.  To  date, the Community's financial  con-
tributions to the automobile industry have been 
granted  for  non-industrial  reasons,  usually 
regional or social. 
Over the  last few  years the following amounts 
have been granted: 
some 290 million units of account (u.a.) in aid 
from  the  European  Regional  Development 
Fund (1975-80); 
some  435 million  u.a.  in  European  Coal  and 
Steel Community (ECSC) loans (1975-80); 
some  250 million  u.a.  in  European  Investment 
Bank loans ( 1975-79); 
several million u.a. in Social Fund aid.• 
When  assessing  the  practical  effect  of these 
contributions, it should be remembered that: 
ERDF  aid  is  only  a  partial  refinancing  of 
national aid and is  designed to have a 'neutral-
izing'  effect,  i.e.  to  compensate  firms  for  the 
cost of siting their plants in specific regions; 
EIB  loans are  granted on the  basis of normal 
market conditions and carry no privileges; 
ECSC  loans,  which  may  be  combined  with 
interest subsidies, are  used  to encourage firms 
to  set  up  plants  and  to  enter  into  various 
employment commitments in  accordance  with 
Article 56 of the ECSC Treaty. 
Their financial impact has been far from  negli-
gible,  since  the  ERDF contributions  towards 
financing  of the  investment  in  question  was 
nearly 7% between 1975 and 1980 and, in many 
cases,  ECSC  loans  have  financed  as  much  as 
50% of the operations in  question (that being 
the  maximum rate).  According to  an  approxi-
'  Point 79; Annex  IS. 
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mate calculation, more than 5 % of investment 
in  the  car industry over the last few  years  has 
been financed out of Community funds. 
These figures show that, as a result of its dyna-
mism, the automobile industry has managed to 
make  considerable  use  of  the  possibilities 
offered  by  the  Community's  financial  instru-
ments. 
The importance of the Commission's contribu-
tion  in  the  future  wiii  not  be  the  amount  it 
spends, but where  it  spends it - e.g.  to  help 
better  coordinate  productivity  improvement 
objectives - and the  way  it raises  and distri-
butes the capital the industry requires.  · 
72.  What has to be decided now is  obviously 
which criteria should be used as a basis for allo-
cating Community financial support. These cri-
teria  might  also serve  as  a  reference  basis  for 
assessing the aid given  by  the  Member States 
and  thus  provide  an  impetus.  Taking  into 
account our previous  remarks  on the  kind  of 
changes the industry will  have to make and the 
circumstances governing its  intervention, these 
criteria could be defined so as to: 
•  encourage  the  integration  of  Community 
activities by supporting attempts at cooperation 
between several manufacturers; 
•  support  the  rationalization  of  component 
manufacturing  since,  for  the  economic  and 
industrial reasons already mentioned (econom-
ies of scale, increasingly international character 
of the market), that is  where efforts should be 
concentrated; Community support would then 
be given  to  component plants, which  account 
for  an  increasing  proportion  of value  added, 
rather than to final assembly lines; 
•  avoid that the conditions for the granting of 
Community aids, amongst other things,  hinder 
technical  progress  by  linking  too  strictly  the 
aids  to  the  number  of jobs  created.  Only  by 
increasing  competitiveness  and rapidly  apply-
ing  technological  progress  can  we  protect 
employment, not only in the automobile indus-
try  but in  the  industries  which  supply  it  and 
depend on it. 
Technologlceleapecta 
73.  The  international  competitiveness  of the 
motor industry has traditionally been based on 
37 its  technological  lead.  In view  of the need to 
produce  - competitively  - vehicles  which 
meet increasinJiy stringent energy requirements 
whilst complying with safety and environmen-
tal  protection  requirements,  the  firms  must 
make better use of the technological lead and 
speed up research. 
Apart from the actual efforts made by the var-
ious zones of production, success will  depend 
on the ability to organize these efforts consis-
tently  over the  long  term,  since  research  and 
development  has  a  rather  long  lead  time 
because of the time-Ia& between the design and 
marketina of vehicles. 
This  time  factor  specific  to  the  automobile 
industry makes for a certain amount of inflexi-
bility  which  to  a  great  extent  determines  the 
transitional  stases  which  the  decisions  to  be 
taken by  the firms  must take into account. It 
highliahts the need for a long-term view of the 
RAD policy to be pursued and the legislative 
implications so that the industry can decide in 
the best possible conditions. 
Research snd  development 
74.  The ftnt point which  has  to  be made is 
that the extent and nature of RAD extends well 
outside the automobile industry in the strictest 
sense. One only has to consider the importance 
of elcctronica, research into new materials and 
experiments  with  alternative  drive  systems  to 
realize that there are many different industries 
involved. 
This being the case, it is  fust necessary to con-
sider the overall positions of the main competi-
tors. The araph in Annex II clearly shows that 
the aeneral level of research in the Community 
is  proportionately  lower  than  in  the  United 
States and for some years now has been over-
taken  as  a  result  of an  increase  in  Japanese 
research. The amounts spent on UD  by indivi-
dual European motor manufacturers also seem 
lower than those spent by their main competi-
tors.  Expenditure on R&D in  motor manufac-
turing  in  the  Europe  of Nine  has  been  esti-
mated at less than  I  0 % of the industry's total 
expenditure; the figure  in the United States is 
at this  level  and that for  Japan substantially 
exceeds it. 
In addition to these figures, we should compare 
the amounts contributed by the various public 
authorities. Although there are considerable dif-
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ferences between the fi&ures  available, they do 
show that the American and Japanese manufac-
turers receive  much more  public support than 
European manufacturers: 
the  US  Government  finances  11  o/o  of  RAD 
expenditure by  motor manufacturers,  whereas 
in Germany and France the fiaure is put at S o/o 
and I o/o respectively; 
the  tax  arran&ements  which  apply  to  RAD 
expenditure  in  Japan  mean  that they  can  be 
partially offset a&ainst profits tax. 
This  is  serious because technological  proaress 
now seems to be the  main growth factor and 
industrial  competitiveness  and  flexibility  of 
production depend in the long term on ability 
to innovate. 
It should be emphasized that the Community 
will  only  be  able  to  take  advanta&e  of the 
opportunities  presented  by  the  reorganization 
of the  automobile  industry,  e.g.  the  use  of 
robots and the use of electronics, if it can come 
up with and implement the new developments 
required in the industries concerned by settin& 
up  production  plants  which  can  cater  for 
changina  demand  requirements.  If it  cannot, 
this will  have extremely serious repercussions, 
not only  in  a  direct  economic  way  but also 
because  of  the  risk  of  European  industry 
becoming technologically subservient. 
75.  Because  of the  increasing  importance of 
the economies of scale which can be achieved 
financially  and industrially,  the  only  solution 
once aaain seems to be cooperation and coordi-
nation.  Dispersal of effort could be extremely 
disadvantageous,  both  as  regards  the  use  of 
already  familiar  technologies  and in  devisin& 
techniques for the future. 
Cooperation  concerns  not  only  automobile 
manufacturers,  who  have  already  set  up  the 
Joint Research Committee• with a view to car-
ryin&  out joint research  in,  for  the  moment, 
non-competin&  areas.  It  should  also  be 
extended  to  the  manufacture  of components 
which can only be modernized by technolo&ical 
developments,  to  the  electronics  industry, 
which will have to provide an essential contri-
bution and to the capital goods industries for 
the  development  of research  into  the  use  of 
robots. 
1  Renault, PSA, 81.., Fiat. VW and Volvo. 
S.2/81 It should concern not only firms but also public 
authorities, universities, trade unions and con-
sumers, which are all affected. 
As stated in para. 19 of Parliament's resolution, 
it  is  only at  European  level  that the  requisite 
coordination can be considered. 
For the present situation to develop along those 
lines, however, an overall approach will have to 
be  devised whereby  a long-term  view  is  taken 
of the whole  of the car industry and its  pros-
pects for change. 
The need for s long-term view 
76.  A  number  of R&D  projects  have  been 
undertaken in  the various  Member States, and 
programmes on the use of alternative fuels and 
the  development of vehicles  of higher  energy 
efficiency are under way. 
The Commission is  also giving support, in the 
form  of studies  and financial  encouragement, 
for specific projects into ways of reducing con-
sumption. 
Hitherto, these  projects  have  been  undertaken 
basically  for  defensive  reasons,  but  it  now 
seems  necessary  to  move  into  a  more  active 
mode, anticipating lona-term  developments in 
the  motor industry on the basis of reasonable 
economic and social assumptions for  the next 
fifteen or twenty years and workina out short-, 
medium- and lona-term objectives accordinaJy. 
At  Community  level,  the  main  points  of this 
policy would be: 
•  action  to  encouraae a  climate  more  favour-
able to innovation ; 
•  supporting the industry's attempts at cooper-
ation: 
•  legislation  in  line  with  technological  and 
economic development;  . 
; 
•  working  out  R&D  guidelines  as  \part  of an 
overall  long-term  view  of the  development of 
the motor car. 
Firms  will  obviously  play  the  le~ding  role 
where  goal-setting  and  attainmen•  are  con-
cerned.  In  this  connection,  the  "'ojects  on 
which  work  is  at present  being cu1ied out in 
the  Joint  Research  Committee  conCerning,  in 
S.2/81 
particular, lona·term research into combustion, 
quality  and  composite  materials  should  be 
encouraged. One of the initiatives taken by this 
Committee  seems  particularly  noteworthy  -
the setting up of a joint centre in the framework 
of which manufacturers will  define the charac-
teristics  of the  electronic  components  needed 
for  cars.  This  venture should make  it possible 
for  requirements  to  be  expressed  in  standar-
dized  fashion;  as  a  result  of the  creation  of 
homogeneous  demand, this  would  be  favour-
able  both  for  users  (less  expensive  supplies) 
and the electronics industry which would have 
a European automobile components market. 
77.  The Commission's contribution, the main 
aim of which would be to help the industry gain 
a better awareness of requirements  and possi-
bilities, would consist of: 
•  One-off operations: 
taking  stock  of  research,  development  and 
innovation work and projects under way in the 
Community,  so  as  to  have  a  clearer  idea  of 
what has been achieved and clarify the options; 
making a contribution to the pursuit of studies 
or  pilot  projects  recognized  as  being  very 
important (e.g. gas turbines, multi-fuel engines, 
etc.); 
•  Ongoing operations with a view to: 
setting  up  observation  and joint consultation 
machinery the  purpose  of which  would  be  to 
provide all the parties concerned with informa-
tion and a forum for exchanaes of views on the 
findings  of  research  and  development  pro-
grammes, developments abroad, and the long-
term  requirements  on  the  various  markets 
throughout the world etc.; 
setting  up  technical  centres  for  research  and 
innovation  concernina  automobile  compo-
nents; 
defining  coordinated  basic  research  pro-
grammes  involving  industry,  universities  and 
public  authorities,  and  setting  up  centres  of 
excellence  for  advanced  technology,  brinaing 
together car-makers, acceuories manufacturers 
and State-run laboratories (in connection with 
hip-temperature materials or composite mate-
rials, for example). 
Such an approach can clearly only be success-
ful  if all the parties concerned are actively and 
coherently involved. 
39 Changes concerning employment 
and regional problems 
78.  The social  implications of the  economic, 
industrial  and technical  developments relating 
to  the automobile  industry will,  of course,  be 
considerable.  They  will  entail  significant 
changes in qualifications and the sectoral allo-
cation  of labour  and  will  affect  the  regional 
location of activities. 
Nature of  the changes 
79.  For  several  years  the  Commission  has 
been taking steps to help adjust employment to 
economic change and improve  industrial rela-
tions.  In  particular,  Social  Fund  operations 
have  been  directly  aimed  at  the  automobile 
industry to enable several thousands of workers 
to be found jobs or retrained. Various types of 
measures have been introduced: 
•  measures concentrated in regions which were 
slow  to develop or where the  principal  indus-
tries were in decline; 
•  encouraging the application of technical pro-
gress  by  means  of specific vocational  training 
operations (use  of robots,  CAD, computeriza-
tion of assembly bays); 
•  increasing job mobility and worker retraining 
in groups of companies. 
It can be seen from  the foregoing remarks that 
in the future there will be changes in: 
the types of jobs; the labour force  will  have to 
face  major conversion  problems  to  cope  with 
structural changes affecting the level of qualifi-
cations  and  the  distribution  of jobs  in  the 
industry; 
the numbers of jobs: the problem will  have to 
be tackled taking the automobile industry in its 
broadest sense, including the  industries  which 
supply  it  upstream  and  depend  on  it  down-
stream. 
80.  Faced with this situation, the trade unions 
have  come  out  in  favour  of shorter  working 
hours,  changes in  the  way  work  is  distributed 
and  a  far-sighted  manpower  policy,•  whereas 
the industry emphasizes that the way the econ-
1  Sec  the  EM F"s  position  papers  of  22.  I  0.  1980  and  13. 4. 
1981. 
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omy is developing will  make it difficult to keep 
improving  social  advantages  and  that  it  is 
necessary to  increase the  rate of utilization  of 
the production equipment. 
However,  more  automated  production,  which 
everyone agrees  to  be  necessary, will  have the 
following consequences: 
•  it  will  cut the workforce employed by  motor 
manufacturers, as a result of the partial shift to 
industries  upstream  (components,  machine 
tools,  industrial  robots  and  electronics)  and 
downstream (servicing and maintenance); 
•  the  proportion of directly-employed workers 
will  drop  and  the  number  of  indirectly-
employed will increase, thus limiting the effect 
of direct labour costs on retail prices and tend-
ing to push up salary levels: 
•  working  conditions  should  improve  as 
tedious jobs are eliminated. 
The  whole  problem really  boils down  to  reor-
ganizing work  and the need to  use  equipment 
more fully, along the lines already followed for 
data-processing equipment. Some kind of solu-
tion may be found in: 
greater  flexibility  in  allocating  work  and  the 
duration of work; 
job enhancement by using equipment favouring 
the use of skilled and versatile labour: 
adjusting  salaries  to  changes  in  qualifications 
and working conditions. 
ThMi  kind of reorganization will  only be  possi-
ble with the agreement of both sides of indus-
try,  and must not be  hampered by  excessively 
inflexible administrative regulations, since it  is 
particularly  important  - in  view  of the  fact 
that the economic and industrial conditions are 
in such a state of flux - that all the economic 
operators involved should display the drive and 
flexibility  required  by  the  scale  of the  adjust-
ments to be made. 
81.  The first stage should, of course, be to try 
to  predict as  accurately  as  possible the  effects 
of the changes under way  on employment and 
working  conditions.  The  shortage  of detailed 
information and research on this· topic is  really 
disturbing  in  the  present  circumstances,  as  it 
restricts the genuine scope for  adjusting to the 
changes and the ability of firms  to find labour 
in line with their requirements. 
S.2/81 The Commission takes the view that it is neces-
sary to collate, expand and assess the informa-
tion and forecasts  concerning the implications 
of the  changes  affecting  production,  and  in 
particular automation,  with  regard  to  employ-
ment,  qualifications  and  working  conditions, 
and  it  will  make  a  contribution  towards  the 
efforts that will be made in this connection. 
82.  Last  but  not  least,  vocational  training 
would seem to be a really important matter. It 
is amazing that, despite the high level of unem-
ployment resulting from  the general economic 
crisis,  a  large  number of jobs remain  unfilled 
because personnel with  the right qualifications 
are just not available, and this leads to  bottle-
necks, very often at strategic points in  the pro-
duction process. 
For example,  according to  a  recent  article  on 
the  situation  in  France  - to  take  only  the 
industries  directly  related  to  the  needs  of the 
automobile  industry  - the  staff complement 
available  for  training  microelectronics  engi-
neers is less than half of what is needed and the 
market for technicians and engineers specializ-
ing in the maintenance of sophisticated equip-
ment (e.g. robots) is very tight. 
Although the  Commission  can  help  with  spe-
cific  operations,  the  main  responsibility  lies 
with the Member States. It is essential that they 
set  up  training,  education  and  vocational 
retraining programmes. 
There  is  a  very  wide  difference  between  the 
average  training levels  of Japanese and  Euro-
pean workers,• and many European companies 
are  already complaining that they cannot find 
enough engineers and technicians with the right 
training to  implement the  production changes 
they  would  like.  This  point  really  must  be 
stressed:  if industry  is  to  change successfully, 
its  workforce must adapt to  new forms  of pro-
duction;  this  is  a  problem  which  is  faced  by 
other industries, too. 
Location of  activities 
83.  The location of automobile manufacturing 
activities  does  not depend solely  on  technical 
requirements. The choice of geographical  area 
for  new  investment  largely  depends  on  the 
I  Point 26. 
S.2/81 
existing equipment, networks for trade between 
industries  and  the  position  of  staff  already 
employed. 
For  fifty  years,  the  Community's  automobile 
industry was the main 'industrializing industry'. 
The  move  towards  units  producing  parts  and 
accessories and the use  of virtually fully-auto-
mated production lines means that other activi-
ties will assume this function. 
It does  not  mean  the  elimination  of human 
involvement  but  the  concentration  of  man-
power on building, maintaining and organizing 
production units, which means replacing semi-
skilled with highly-skilled jobs. 
From  a  general point of view,  it  follows  from 
the above that the structural  changes required 
will  increasingly  shift  the  proportion  of  the 
value  added  in  automobile  manufacture  to 
industries further up the chain, particularly the 
component-makers. This will  have major reper-
cussions  on  the  geographical  distribution  of 
investment since the growth in the value added 
of the  product causes  markets  to  expand and 
these can be served from one single production 
unit  (the  cost  of purchasing  and  transporting 
the  raw  materials  and of distributing  the  fin-
ished product would be  less significant in  rela-
tion to the overall cost price). 
In addition, these plants will  have much larger 
production  capacities  than  the  plant  they 
replace; they  will  employ fewer  staff but they 
will  be  more  highly  skilled.  Such  plants  will 
also make much more extensive use of outside 
services than the old plants. This factor ties in 
with the effects of the trend towards the 'world 
car',  leading  to  the  erection  of  production 
plants which  are  designed to serve larger mar-
kets.• 
All  these factors  ultimately increase the degree 
of flexibility with regard to options for the loca-
tion of production, and accentuate the stimulat-
ing effect of the instruments now available for 
the implementation of regional policies. 
The dynamics of the internal 
market 
84.  The Community automobile market is the 
second largest in  the world after the American 
1  Point 20. 
41 market  where  passenger  cars  are  concerned.1 
Allowina for differences in  car ownership lev-
els,  it is  this  market which  will  generate - in 
absolute  terms  - the  major  part  of  world 
demand in the years ahead. This  is  an impor-
tant advantage for the Community automobile 
industry, since a broad, homogeneous internal 
market is needed as the basis for the industrial 
changes needed, and the precondition for mak-
ing them pay otT, from three points of view: 
possibility of producing on a  large  scale,  and 
hence of benefiting from the economies of scale 
inherent in series production; 
diversification  of demand,  thereby  increasing 
the development potential; 
impetus  to  innovate,  a  vital  necessity  with  a 
view to improving competitiveness. 
Strengthening the internal market, and making 
use of the dynamics of the internal market, i.e. 
combining all  the favourable  effects  attaching 
to  the size  of the  market,  are  therefore  really 
important: 
for all the economic operators with responsibil-
ity for bringing about this economic entity, and 
above  all  for  the  firms,  on  which  it  falls  to 
exploit the potential developed in this way. 
85.  The  action  taken  by  the  Commission  in 
the  last  two  decades  has  made  it  possible  to 
achieve a great deal in this area, in particular as 
a result of the removal of technical barriers to 
intra-Community  trade,  by  virtue  of  which 
manufacturers can now produce the same vehi-
cles for all Member States. 
However, an examination of the present situa-
tion  indicates  just  how  much  remains  to  be 
achieved  in  order  to  create  an  environment 
which  is  genuinely  favourable to the develop-
ment of the motor car within the Community. 
The  dimension  required  for  the  structural 
adjustments  to  the  automobile  industry  is 
clearly  that  of the  Community,  and  greater 
efforts will be required with a view to the grad-
ual  converaence  of the  many  heterogeneous 
aspects and in order to achieve greater consist-
ency  within  the  Community  framework.  The 
prospects afforded by framing of legislation in 
1  Annex I. 
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line with technical and economic developments 
are,  to  the Commission's  way  of thinking, an 
important aspect in the creation of the environ-
ment required. 
The general fremework 
Removal of  barriers to Intra-Community 
trade 
Achievements to date 
86.  Optimum conditions for automobile man-
ufacture  in  relation  to  the  size  of the  market 
cannot exist in the Community unless the tech-
nical  characteristics  of the  vehicles  manufac-
tured in each Member State are such that they 
can be freely sold on the other markets. Only if 
this  condition  is  fulfilled  can  economies  of 
scale be  fully  exploited. This  basic considera-
tion illustrates the industrial effect of harmoniz-
ing  legislation,  the  practical  expression  of 
which  is  the  removal  of technical  barriers  to 
intra-Community trade. 
The  Commission  has  naturally  given  promin-
ence to  this action in  the automobile sector in 
view  of the  economic  importance  involved: 
exports  of  motor  vehicles  between  Member 
States are almost 50 o/o  higher than exports out-
side  the  Community, totalling some  2 700 000 
units in 1980. 
The Commission has almost reached its goal of 
achieving  EEC  type-approval,  enabling  the 
technical  specifications  of a  vehicle  approved 
in one Member State to be recognized through-
out the Community. 
Such has been the progress with the harmoniza-
tion of the technical characteristics of vehicles 
in the last ten years, thanks to the efforts of the 
Commission  in  close  conjunction  with  the 
industry, that there are now fewer differences in 
specifications between the Member States than 
exist  between the  various  states  in  the  USA. 1 
The  areas  where  harmonization  is  still  to  be 
achieved  are  not  a  source  of concern  for  the 
automobile  industry,  which  is  now  able  to 
exploit the advantages of series production. 
1  Fifty-nine  Directives  have  been  adopted  in  this  field, 
includina those  relatinJ to adaptation  to technical  PI'OJretS 
(Annex 13). 
S.2/81 It has been estimated that these harmonization 
measures  have  produced cost  price savings  of 
more than 10 %. 
Questions outstanding 
87.  The Community type-approval system has 
not yet been put into practice. All  that remains 
is  for  the  latest  Directives  on  the  removal  of 
technical barriers to  trade in  motor vehicles to 
be  adopted,  as  called  for  in  para. 14  of the 
European  Parliament  resolution:  the  three 
Commission proposals remaining (windscreens, 
tyres and permitted towing weight') have been 
before the Council for some time.  As  the reso-
lution also points out, adoption of these propo-
sal will pave the way for an EEC type-approval 
certificate for  motor vehicles which  would put 
the Community in a strong negotiating position 
- under the  new  GAIT agreements  - con-
cerning reciprocity in respect of non-tariff bar-
riers.  The  present  problem  is  one  of external 
trade since the industrial benefits of harmoniza-
tion can now be fully exploited. 
It is for this reason that the full implementation 
of EEC type-approval is now directly linked to 
the  concept  of  Community  certification  for 
industrial  products  coming  from  non-member 
countries; a Commission proposal for a Direc-
tive on this  subject is  also  pending before the 
Council.z 
The two areas for detailed consideration are: 
the accessibility of vehicles  from  non-member 
countries in a truly unified internal Community 
market  in  which  a  vehicle  approved  in  one 
Member  State  would,  de  facto,  meet  the 
required  marketing  specifications  in  the  other 
Member  States.  This  matter  is  obviously 
directly connected with the question of the bal-
ance of trade;' 
the  reciprocity  which  the  Community  has  a 
right to expect from  other manufacturing zones 
regarding the removal of non-tariff barriers.  In 
this connection, the industry has called on the 
Community  on  various  occasions  to  promote 
international  trade  actively,  in  particular 
I  OJ c 119,  16.  II. 1972; OJ c 15,  20.  I.  1977; OJ c 37,  14. 2. 
1977. 
2  OJ C 54, 4. 3.  1980. 
s  Points 98 "seq. 
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through the removal of the barriers to exports to 
other parts of the world. Accordinaly, the Com-
mission  has  already  approached the  Japanese 
authorities with a call for  the removal of tech-
nical  barriers  to  automobile  exports  to Japan 
and,  in  particular,  for  the  simplification  of 
type-approval  procedures  and  the  delayed 
implementation of standards relating to  pollu-
tant emissions  in  respect of vehicles  imported 
from the EEC. 
As things  stand, it  would  appear to  be  hiahly 
desirable that any attempt to find a solution -
which  would naturally involve the adoption of 
the  Directive  on  non-member  countries  and 
Community  certification - does  not  increase 
protectionist pressures and lead to a fraamenta-
tion of the internal market. 
88.  Consideration should  also  be  given  to  a 
final point concernina the removal of technical 
barriers,  namely roadworthiness tests.  The fact 
that some Member States still do not have the 
facilities for testing private cars is disruptive to 
the trade in second-hand cars between Member 
States. 
There  are  grounds  for  thinkina that the  wide-
spread  introduction  on  a  European  scale  of 
roadworthiness  tests  for  passen1er vehicles -
as called for in para. 15  of Parliament's resolu-
tion  and  by  a  number  of manufacturers  -
would  have  beneficial  effects  on  safety,  the 
environment,  fuel  consumption  and  mainte-
nance  of  vehicles  and  on  the  pattern  of 
demand. 
However,  those  Member  States  which  do  not 
have such a system believe that its introduction 
would  have  an  adverse  effect  in  cost-benefit 
terms. 
In  the final  analysis, some preliminary investi-
gation should be carried out to verify the value 
of broadening  the  scope  of the  Community 
Directive  on  roadworthiness  tests,  1  which  was 
restricted  by  the Council to commercial  vehi-
cles when it was adopted. 
The automotive environment in the 
Community 
89.  However, the technical unity of the inter-
nal market, to which the removal of barriers to 
I  OJ L 47.  18. 2.  1977. 
43 trade  has  contributed, should  not  conceal  the 
many differences still affecting the automotive 
environment  within  the  Community.  These 
persisting differences are preventing firms from 
exploiting  the  full  potential  offered  by  the 
dimension  provided  by  the Community as  an 
economic entity. 
A brief review  of the  conditions affecting  the 
manufacture,  acquisition  and  use  of  motor 
vehicles  in  the  Community  will  highlight  the 
diversities  which  exist,  and the  policies  which 
could  be  pursued  by  the  various  parties  con-
cerned, in order to arrive at a solution. 
Manufacture 
90.  Mention  has  already  been  made  of the 
impact of taxation on the conditions of produc-
tion.1  In  this respect, the circumstances in  the 
various  Member  States  are  highly  disparate. 
The  national taxation systems, over which  the 
Member  States  still  exercise  almost  supreme 
authority,  are  highly  divergent  and  complex 
and  it  is  very  difficult  to  determine  - for  a 
given Member State - whether the systems are 
more or less  favourable to automobile produc-
tion than in another Member State or in Japan. 
This situation raises two key issues, i.e.: 
the distortions which may, for purely fiscal rea-
sons,  affect  the  conditions  of  competition 
between Community manufacturers;2 
the overall effectiveness of any aid granted: it is 
clear that fiscal measures have played a particu-
larly effective part in  developing the competi-
tiveness of the Japanese industry although the 
financial  burden  has  been  no  greater  than  in 
other competing countries. 
Harmonization measures already carried out or 
proposed  by  the  Commission  have  concen-
trated  on  structural  aspects  and  taxable 
amounts. 
In  the  coming years,  the  action  will  continue 
along these lines and a whole series of propo-
sals have yet  to be made in  this  field,  particu-
larly as regards the determination of firms' tax-
able profits. 
•  Point 74. 
•  Point 65. 
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Apart  from  the  structural  disparities  ex1stmg 
between the various taxation systems, mention 
should also be made of the vast spread of rates 
of taxation,  which  are  again  laid  down  under 
the  sovereign  authority  of the  Member States 
and have a direct effect on the number of vehi-
cles purchased. 
Vehicle acquisition 
91.  There  are  considerable  discrepancies  in 
the  national  laws  concerning vehicle  purchase 
taxes (VAT and registration  fees):  in  Denmark 
and  Greece,  for  example,  the  level  of these 
charges  is  particularly high, but they are  fairly 
low in  Luxembourg. 
The  effects  may  be  assessed  from  two  main 
angles: 
•  The general level of taxation directly affects 
the volume of vehicle demand, and the relative 
differences  in  this  taxation  burden  conse-
quently manifest themselves in divergent trends 
in the markets affected; 
•  The  methods  by  which  this  taxation  is 
applied (methods of calculation  etc.)  have  an 
impact  on the  actual  pattern  of demand  and 
thus  have  a  favourable  or adverse  effect  on 
particular stages of the production process. This 
also  considerably  upsets  the  homogeneity  of 
the  internal  market,  which,  in  turn,  may  also 
have  significant commercial  repercussions  vis-
a-vis  external  competitors  for  example,  by 
encouraging imports of low-priced vehicles, as 
has  happened  in  Denmark  and  Greece.  The 
Commission  would  draw  the  attention  of the 
Member  States  to  the  favourable  effects  that 
would  flow  from  greater  solidarity  within  the 
Community in this respect; this  would lead to 
less divergent policies. 
Finally,  a  more  general  factor  concerning the 
acquisition  of  vehicles  in  the  Community 
should also be  stressed, namely the role of the 
consumers themselves, who have a dual respon-
sibility by  being concerned both with the oper-
ation of the manufacturing system and by  tak-
ing decisions to purchase. 
Since the conditions of production on the Com-
munity market are different from those in other 
manufacturing areas a clear distinction should 
be made as regards consumption between: 
s. 2181 •  the purchase of Community products which 
may  be  more  expensive  because  their  cost 
reflects  a  standard  of living  which  does  not 
exist in certain competing countries, and 
•  the acquisition of cheaper vehicles manufac-
tured under different circumstances where there 
is  clearly  an  indirect  cost  to  the  Community 
since it  leads to a market loss and hence to an 
erosion of the Community's industrial base. 
Use 
92.  There  are  two  overriding  factors  which 
affect  the  use  of motor  vehicles,  namely  the 
cost of fuel  and road taxes, on the one hand, 
and the cost of  insurance, on the other. 
The taxes on fuel, which constitute an essential 
element of the prices of these products, and the 
road  taxes,  the  calculation  methods  of which 
are  very  variable  from  one  Member  State  to 
another, can also affect the pattern of demand 
(for  example,  the  ratio  of petrol- to  diesel-
driven  vehicles):  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
excise duty on diesel fuel is high, but it is much 
lower in ltaly.1 Overall, the proportion of excise 
duty in the price of fuel has dropped since 1973 
in  many  Member States.  Bearing in  mind the 
aims  to  be  pursued  in  the  energy  sector,  it 
would seem desirable that this relative propor-
tion should remain the same or even be levelled 
out in future. 
This disparity may also be observed in relation 
to  the  cost  of third-party  insurance  which  is 
influenced in  particular by the third-party lia-
bility systems themselves, which have not been 
hannonized,  and  by  the  amounts  for  which 
vehicles  have to be insured. The Commission 
made some proposals with a view  to 'approxi-
mation' in this respect in August 1980.  · 
In  addition, it  may  be  unwise to advocate an 
examination of the 'practical scope there is  for 
an  agreement  between  producers  of compo-
nents,  insurance companies and organizations 
of vehicle repairers to expedite, standardize and 
reduce the cost of the procedures followed for 
repairing  vehicles  and  settling  complaints' 
referred to in  para. 29  of the European  Parlia-
ment resolution, since there is a possibility that 
the partitioning of markets would increase as a 
• Tablea in Annex 12. 
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result  of such  an  agreement,  a  trend  which 
would  run  counter  to  the  efforts  now  being 
made by the Commission to ensure freedom in 
the provision of  services in the insurance sector. 
All  the matters raised above provide the basis 
for an analysis of the main aspects involved in 
strengthening the cohesion of the Community's 
internal market. 
In the  light of this, the Commission takes  the 
view that an important aspect of its efforts must 
concern  legislation  in  line  with  technological 
and economic development. 
The outlook u  regarda leglaletlon 
93.  The  effect  of Ieaislation  on  the  motor 
vehicle industry is  not merely  confined to the 
direct impact of constraints concerning safety 
and  environmental  conservation  and  energy 
consumption,  it  may  also  significantly  affect 
the competitive position of rival zones of pro-
duction. 
Hence  the  need  for  a  European  approach 
embodying all these aspects. 
The economic importance of  legis/stion 
9/.  Legislation has had a marked effect on the 
automobile industry in recent years. In the new 
economic  order  created  in  the  wake  of the 
energy  crisis  and  characterized  by  increased 
international competition, legislation will - by 
virtue of its economic impact - be required to 
play a decisive part. 
The facts of  the problem 
95.  The scope of legislation is  becoming ever 
wider:  in  addition  to  safety  and the  environ-
ment, increasing attention is being paid by the 
legislative bodies to energy consumption, either 
because of dependence on external supplies or 
because of the specific importance of the motor 
vehicle  sector  in  the  total  consumption  of 
petroleum products. 
From  this  point of view,  the  situation  in  the 
United States is markedly different from that in 
45 Europe  and  Japan  in  that  the  US  is  less 
dependent on external  supplies;  on  the  other 
hand, the automobile sector accounts for a par-
ticularly high  share of oil demand (30 o/o  com-
pared with 16-17 o/o in Europe). 
The present situation in  the three major manu-
facturing zones is as follows: 
Japan. Tough legislation already exists regard-
ing safety and the environment, and manufac-
turers have adopted voluntary taraets concern-
ing  the  reduction  of fuel  consumption  which 
are generally much more severe than those cur-
rently envisaged in Europe. 
United States. The existing regulations on safe. 
ty  and the  environment have  been  backed up 
by administrative constraints to reduce the rela-
tively  high  levels  of consumption,  bearing  in 
mind the present efficiency ratings of American 
cars.  The  new  Administration  has  recently 
embarked  on  a  deregulation  policy  consisting 
of removing a number of constraints,• reducing 
restrictions  concerning  the  formulation  and 
implementation  timetable  for  projects  main· 
tained, and turning towards active cooperation 
with the industry in determining future  objec-
tives. 
Europe.  The  regulations  on  safety  are  fairly 
stringent but are less so as regards the environ-
ment (with the exception of noise). At present, 
the only constraints on consumption consist of 
voluntary commitments given by manufacturers 
to  their respective  governments  to  reduce  the 
fuel consumption of their vehicles. 
Taking into account the changes under way in 
the rival manufacturing zones, and in particular 
deregulation  in  the  United  States,  objectives 
must be set and resources must be deployed in 
order to secure a  more  homogeneous  body of 
leaislation in the Community. The problem to 
be  resolved  is  extremely  complicated,  since 
account must be taken of legislative constraints 
in  all  the  measures  for  reducing  energy  con-
sumption  and,  in  particular,  tax  provisions.z 
The  advisability of makina  use  of motor fuel 
excise taxes in order to  keep fuel  costs in  line 
with  the  general  price trend, and the  possible 
effects of a more general reorganization of pur-
chase  taxes  and  vehicle  use  taxes  based  on 
energy  consumption,  have  already  been 
emphasized. 
1  Thiny-four different rqulations in the first stqe. 
2  Point89. 
Moreover, it is necessary to: 
•  reconcile  the  aims  of improving safety  and 
reducing noise  on the  one hand and reducing 
fuel consumption on the other, 
•  take  into account the disparity which  exists 
within the European industry and the effects of 
legislation on its competitive position. 
Economic impact of  regulations 
96.  This is closely bound up with the effect of 
regulations  on  the  competitive  capacity  of 
firms.  The inter-relationship between the legis-
lative and competitive factors  must be  viewed 
from three complementary viewpoints, i.e.: 
•  Any  delay  in  the  legislative  programme 
would  make  the  European  domestic  market 
increasingly vulnerable to  outside competition 
and would encourage latent protectionist trends 
which would not only threaten the cohesion of 
the  internal  market but would  also jeopardize 
the  progress  already  achieved  in  the  field  of 
commercial and tariff policy; 
•  The  penetration  of foreign  markets  would 
become even more difficult because - in order 
to  comply  with  local regulations - the  Euro-
pean products would have to  undergo modifi-
cations which  would  be very  costly since they 
would  not  be  part  of the  normal  production 
process.  For  foreign  competitors,  the  effect 
would  obviously  be  the  opposite  since  they 
would  have  no  difficulty  in  exporting  their 
more sophisticated mass-produced products to 
zones where the constraints were less strict; 
•  The cost of introducing regulations is closely 
bound up with the length of production runs. 
From this point of view, the European automo-
bile  industry - already  handicapped in  com-
parison  with  the Japanese and the  Americans 
- could  not cope with  heterogeneous  regula-
tions within the Community. 
Given  the  increasingly  international  nature  of 
the  motor vehicle market, legislation will  have 
to  take  greater account  of international  trade 
since those States with  the strictest regulations 
will  be able not only to dictate general market 
trends  - if their  manufacturers  are  powerful 
enough  - but  also  to  protect  their  domestic 
markets  and  promote  their  exports.  Accord-
ingly,  it  is  highly desirable that at Community 
S.2/81 level  there  be  formulated  a  legislative  pro-
gramme which reflects all these aspects. 
Definition of  an integrated approach 
97.  The  attitudes  of the  interested  parties to 
the  trend  in  legislation  in  the  Community are 
still very different: 
The trade unions support the establishment or 
strenathening of European standards relating to 
fuel  economy, the campaign  against  pollution 
and nuisances and safety, emphasizing that this 
can only help to increase the competitiveness of 
European manufacturers: 
The  automobile  industry,  on  the  other  hand, 
calls  on  the  Community  to  give  priority  to 
improved competitiveness rather than  to  mar-
ginal improvements - e.g. concerning environ-
mental protection - which could be achieved 
by  tightening  up  Community  motor  vehicle 
standards; 
The  European  Parliament  resolution  requests 
the  Commission  'to  conduct  a  survey  of the 
effects  of Community  regulations  on  energy 
saving, safety and pollution.' 
These  different  shades  of  opinion  are  also 
apparent  among the  Member  States,  some  of 
which want the pollution legislation to be tight-
ened  while  others  stress  the  difficulties  for 
industry of over-stringent environmental legis-
lation. 
At the same time, these questions are being dis-
cussed at the highest level in the United States,1 
and have led certain Community partner States 
to  tighten  up  administrative  constraints  (e.g. 
Sweden and Switzerland). 
The  Commission  has  already  undertaken  a 
number of studies on certain aspects of the rel-
evant legislation and is holding detailed discus-
sions  with  the industry on this topic.  Further-
more, the Directives already adopted are being 
regularly adapted to changes in  technical  pro-
gress. 
Two topics can be considered here and now. 
speed limits: there are  now very  few  regions  in 
which  speed  limits  have  not  yet  been  intro-
duced.  The  economic  benefits  (reduction  in 
1  Poinll 39 and 93. 
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fuel  consumption  and  vehicle  cost  prices) 
which the generalization and standardization of 
speed  limits  could  promote  must  be  consid-
ered; 
the balance betw"n active and passive safety: in 
many cases,  with  the  present state of technol-
ogy,  passive safety tends to increase fuel  con-
sumption. A careful examination of the options 
open  and  policy  to  be  pursued  in  this  area 
would undoubtedly be very useful, and over the 
last three years the Commission, in conjunction 
with all the relevant bodies in Europe, has been 
carrying out a major study programme on bio-
mechanics, the findings of which, which will be 
available in 1982, will provide food for thought. 
In the  present circumstances, bearing in  mind 
the pressure exerted by rising energy costs and 
the  direct  effects  of the  energy  efficiency  of 
vehicles  on the conditions of competition, the 
Commission  does  not  think  it  advisable  to 
introduce le1islation on fuel consumption. 
In the light of all the factors mentioned above, 
however, there is  a need to adapt the relevant 
legislation  to  the  changes  in  the  economic, 
technological and energy situation. With this in 
view,  a global  approach must be adopted, i.e. 
taking  simultaneous  account  of  the  factors 
relating to energy saving, the environment and 
safety and the salient decisions taken in respect 
of other markets in order in create a stable leg-
islative climate conducive to the defence of the 
competitive positions of the Community indus-
try. 
The changing balance of 
international trade 
98.  It is vital for the Community that its auto-
mobile  industry  responds  positively  to  the 
changing  balance  of international  trade.  An 
examination of the chan1es affecting the trend 
and structure of trade hiahliahts the economic 
and industrial opportunity of achieving stabil-
ized patterns of trade. 
The  relaxation  of present  tensions,  and  the 
changes that are 1oing to occur in the distribu-
tion  of automobile  production throughout the 
world, will therefore basically result from politi-
cal consultation between the various producing 
countries,  since  the  growing  integration  of 
production structures is conditional on the con-
47 sistency of the decisions to be taken with regard 
to external investment and industrial coopera-
tion. 
The redeployment of trade 
99.  The present situation is characterized by a 
marked imbalance in the situations of the var-
ious manufacturing zones with respect to trade 
in automobiles. 
Developments conductive to a lessening of the 
commercial pressures created by this imbalance 
could, however, lead to a redeployment in the 
patterns of trade made necessary by the struc-
tural changes taking place within this sector. 
Imbalance 
100.  The present situation regarding trade in 
motor vehicles in the three major manufactur-
ing zones may be summarized as follows: 1 
the  United  States is  a  net importer, output is 
currently some I · 8 million vehicles below con-
sumption; 
the Community is a net exporter, manufacturing 
one  million  more  passenger cars  than  it  con-
sumes; 
in Japan, there is  a large surplus in the balance 
of trade since over 50 o/o  of the total output is 
exported whereas imports are currently negligi-
ble; the  net surplus  in  the trade in  passenger 
cars is close to four million units. 
This global review highlights the severe imbal-
ance in the patterns of trade in passenger cars. 
Even  including the other items of trade asso-
ciated  with  motor  vehicles  (commercial  vehi-
cles, components, machine tools, etc.) the over-
all assessment remains the same. 
Within  the  Community,  there  are  also  major 
disparities between the levels of penetration of 
Japanese  vehicles  (which  alone  account  for 
more than 50 % of Community imports2 on the 
various markets.l The reasons for these dispari-
ties are as follows: 
1  Annex I : Passenger cars. 
• Annex  I. 
3  Point4S. 
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historical:  Italy  has  a  system  for  the  formal 
curbing of imports of Japanese cars which have 
been  limited since  1956  to  2 200  vehicles  per 
year; or 
commercial:  voluntary  restrictions  or  de  facto 
stabilization  of Japanese  sales  in  the  United 
Kingdom and France. 
The  commercial  pressures  caused  by  these 
imbalances  have  led  to  calls  in  the  United 
States and in  Europe for a  curb on exports of 
Japanese vehicles.  On 25  November  1980,  the 
Community's Council of Ministers  issued  the 
following statement: 
' ... in the sectors where a continued increase in 
Japanese exports to the European Community 
would  lead  to  difficulties,  there  needs  to  be 
effective moderation designed to produce early 
and tangible results.  This should apply to the 
European Community as a whole and not only 
to certain markets'. 
It is nevertheless clear that relations in the auto-
mobile sector must be seen in a global context 
and that any decisions taken in this field in the 
Community, the United States and in Japan are 
closely interdependent.1  In addition, the role of 
the developing countries - in which the motor 
car is a major industrial factor- should not be 
overlooked. 
10/.  The  potential  danger facing  these  three 
major  manufacturing  zones  is  obviously  an 
increase in protectionist pressures which would 
be  damaging to  them  all  since  it  would  lead 
inevitably  to  a  downturn  in  world  trade  as  a 
whole. 
As a recent GA  1T  report points out: 
' ... If a government increases trade barriers to 
delay  adjustments  in  the  stock  of  domestic 
plant  and  equipment,  it  will  aggravate  the 
financial  imbalance  of  the  banking  sector 
through the impact of that action on the profit-
ability,  and  thus  on  the  risk  of  default  of 
export-oriented  firms.  Even  in  the absence of 
retaliation,  protective  action  would  hurt  not 
only foreign exporters, but also export firms in 
the  protecting country. This is  due to the fact 
that any import-reducing action will eventually 
lead to a decline in exports. The decline results 
from (i) the reduction in foreign exchange earn-
1  Points 28 and 32. 
S.2/81 ings abroad, and (ii) the reduced availability to 
the exporting firms  of domestic resources, tied 
up in the protected sector.' 
This  reasoning  is  particularly  apposite  to  the 
automobile  sector,  where  any blockage  in  the 
adjustment mechanism would be  likely to turn 
the recession  into a crisis.  Moreover, the argu-
ments developed earlier clearly reveal the possi-
bility of ensuring continued growth in  this sec-
tor through the coherent adaptation of trading 
structures.  Seen in this  light, industrial change 
is  not  a  burden  but  an  activity  generating 
revenue to  provide the basis for a new  upturn 
in  this  industry  and  in  the  various  related 
trades. 
Stabilization of  trade relations 
/02.  The underlying reason for the increasing 
commercial  pressures  in  the  motor  vehicle 
industry  is  that the  pressures  are  unduly  and 
disproportionately  concentrated  at  the  end-
product  stage.  Careful  scrutiny  of  possible 
future trends in the automobile sector neverthe-
less  points  to  the  economic  and  industrial 
opportunity  of  achieving  - through  more 
intense world-wide integration of motor vehicle 
production - stable and healthy trading struc-
tures  based on increased trade in  components 
and on a balanced development in the siting of 
productions units. 
It should also be pointed out that future assess-
ments of this sector should increasingly include 
not only the sale of finished vehicles and com-
ponents but also trade in  industrial  plant and 
technology. 
Without  wishing  at  this  stage  to  reiterate  the 
detailed  arguments  concerning  the  changing 
patterns of trade contained in  Part One of this 
report, it is  worth while to recall the main fac-
tors  which  - if exploited  positively - could 
provide a stable basis for international trade in 
motor vehicles. 
From a technical and industrial point of view, 
two phenomena merit attention, namely: 
the  increasing  disassociation  in  the  stages  of 
automobile production which, for reasons to  do 
with  economies of scale,  have  different  levels 
of optimum operation; 
a shift in  value-added to sectors upstream (com-
ponents  and  industrial  plant)  and  making  it 
more 'brain-intensive'. 
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These two phenomea affect the balance of fac-
tors  influencing the siting of production units 
by  giving  greater  flexibility  of  choice  (less 
dependence on the traditional criteria concern-
ing the international division of labour) and by 
promoting  an  increase  in  world-wide  integra-
tion of motor vehicle production (need to man-
ufacture components in large quantities and the 
possibility of easier siting of a  particular pro-
duction or assembly stage  in  the  various  mar-
kets). 
The  consequence  of this  development  where 
trade is concerned is the possibility of substitu-
tion or, at the very least, an increase in the pro-
portion of trade in components, capital equip-
ment  and  knowhow  compared  with  trade  in 
finished  products  ..  The  importance  of this  is 
twofold since it would not only reduce the level 
of tension  in  trade but would also strengthen 
trading links by giving them a sound industrial 
base. 
External investment and industrial cooperation 
would  obviously  provide the  basis  for  such  a 
reorientation, which will, of course, be success-
ful  only  if the  economic  partners  concerned 
have the same political aims. 
Extemellnveatment end Industrial 
cooperation 
103.  The importance of the issues relating to 
these two subjects is  underlined in  the resolu-
tion  passed  by  the  European  Parliament  on 
13 January  1981,  paras 25,  26  and 27  of which 
deal  with  investments  by  non-member  coun-
tries  in  the Community, investments by  Euro-
pean  manufacturers  in  non-member  countries 
and  the  establishment  of joint  undertakings. 
Two  trends  are  evident,  namely,  the  growing 
integration  of production  structures  and  the 
increasing number of cooperation agreements. 
Integration of  production structures 
/04.  Although  welcoming  investment  made 
by  European  motor  vehicle  manufacturers  in 
non-member  countries,  the  European  Parlia-
ment resolution draws the Commission's atten-
tion to the possible repercussions of non-mem-
ber country investments in the Community. 
49 On  this  second  point,  the  industry  has  also 
repeatedly  stressed  that  the  establishment  in 
Europe after the Second World War of subsidi-
aries of North American companies is the best 
example of successful integration, made possi-
ble  by  the  high  degree  of local  acceptance 
which  placed  these  companies  in  competitive 
positions directly comparable to those enjoyed 
by European-based firms. 
It follows  logically  from  the  foregoing  argu-
ments that the issue should be considered in the 
following terms: 
•  the world wide scale of motor vehicle manu-
facture  nullifies  any  assessments  based  on  a 
'compartmentalized' conception of the various 
markets: 
•  as a result, the options open to the industry 
no  longer  come  within  the  ambit  of the  two 
traditional and alternative policies adopted by 
American  and  Japanese  manufacturers  in 
recent decades, i.e.: 
in the case of the Americans, the installation of 
the  entire  manufacturing operation in  the  rel-
evant markets, or 
in the Japanese case, the centralized production 
in the country of origin and the direct export of 
finished products. 
105.  In future, automobile manufacturers will 
have  to  gear  their  production  and  marketing 
strategies to a distribution of the manufacturing 
and trading  activities between  all  the  markets 
involved. In other words, this means the large-
scale  development  of  policies  akin  to  those 
already  pursued for  many  years  by  European 
manufacturers, as practised locally by Japanese 
firms  in  the Asian  markets and which are  cur-
rently being developed by the major American 
companies.1 Such a change would entail a sub-
stantial  increase in  motor vehicle  trade geoer-
ally and rapid diversification in its structure. In 
addition to  this  basically favourable  aspect,  it 
would make it possible to envisage a more bal-
anced  development  of trade  since  it  would 
increase the reciprocal advantages for the var-
ious manufacturing zones and the opportunities 
for  intra- and  inter-sectoral  trade-off.  Since 
such  a  development  is  directly dependent on 
the decisions of firms regarding external invest-
ments,  it  also  concerns  the  public  authorities 
who are largely responsible for determining the 
I  Point 20. 
conditions in  which the foreign investing com-
panies are received. It would be detrimental to 
all the economic operators involved if more ser-
ious  divergent  trends  were  to  appear  - not 
only  between  the  major  manufacturing  zones 
but  also  within  the  zones  themselves.  The 
Member  States  of  the  Community  have  a 
special  responsibility  in  this  respect  since  dif-
ferences in attitude to the manner in which for-
eign  investors  are  welcomed  would  naturally 
have serious repercussions for the Community 
industry  as  a  whole.  In  this  connection,  it 
would  be  useful  if  the  Member  States  could 
take  account  of the  guidelines that the  Com-
mission  will  be  laying down regarding criteria 
for granting Community support.  I 
This matter is all  the more important since the 
development  of  industrial  cooperation  has 
become  necessary  in  order  to  improve  the 
economic effectiveness of the  industry and to 
ease commercial pressure. 
Development of  cooperation 
agreements 
/06.  Whereas  there  have  been  comparatively 
few industrial cooperation asreements in recent 
decades  and  only  then  restricted  to  specific 
requirements,  recent  years  have  seen  a  sharp 
increase in their number and type coupled with 
a  greater diversification  in the underlying rea-
sons.  The  following  examples  illustrate  this 
point: 
the  American  corporations  have  developed 
their links with  the Japanese industry through 
financial  participation  and  trade  agreements 
which are now widening to embrace industrial 
and technological trade ;2 
a  number  of  agreements  have  been  signed 
recently between Japanese and European com-
panies  (Honda  and  British  Leyland:  Nissan 
and Alfa, Motor Iberica and Volkswagen): 
the  acquisition  of  holdings  with  a  practical 
impact in industrial terms by companies in the 
Community and in the United States (Renault-
AMC, Peugeot-Chrysler): 
cooperation  agreements  between  Community 
and East  European  manufacturers have  taken 
on new forms.l 
1  Points 77 and 72. 
•  Point 30. 
3  Point 34. 
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underlying  trend  already  mentioned  towards 
the  gradual  integration  on  a  world  scale  of 
motor vehicle production and also the recourse 
to highly varied and flexible methods of mak-
ing the many adjustments in this sector: 
recovery of  firms in difficulty, 
adaptation  of technologically  backward  com-
panies, 
harmonization  of  the  conditions  of  inter-
national competition, 
rationalization and strenathenina of  trade. 
It is therefore important not only to encourage 
this trend but also to master its repercussions. 
107.  Hence the need to develop areater coop-
eration between the economic and political ent-
ities involved. This clearly means that everyone 
should  play  the  free-trade  same and  comply 
with GATT rules.  On this  point, the Commis-
sion  takes  the  view  that  the  Community, the 
United States and Japan should fully recopize 
their  responsibilities  to  ensure  the  continued 
existence of the free economic order, in  which 
they are the main protagonists. 
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As  the  Commiuion  pointed  out  durins  the 
European Parliament's debate on the European 
automobile industry on 13 January 1981, all the 
beneficiaries  of this  system  should  share  the 
burden: in  this  respect,  Japan is  in  a  special 
situation since, for historical and structural rea-
sons, its present contribution is less than that of 
its  partners.  It would  not  be normal  for  this 
state of affairs to continue and for this country 
to  maintain  its  intransi,ent  position  vu.Q  .. vis 
tradins  arranaements,  whereby  manufactured 
products could leave but not enter the country. 
Each  partner  has  a  ri1ht  to expect  from  the 
others  a  fair  contribution  to the  proper func-
tioning of a system of benefit to them all. 
In the  final  analysis,  the world  motor vehicle 
industry  will  not  develop  as it  should  unless 
there  is  truly  reciprocal  and effective  inteara-
tion of manufacturing and trading structures. 
The Commission has the political will to contri-
bute to  this objective, but positive results will 
only be achieved if the three major manufactur-
ins areas, namely the Community, the  United 
States  and Japan,  strive  to  achieve  the  same 
aims. 
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The •utomobllelnduatry, 1970-80 (P••••nger c•ra) 
Year  Community  USA  Japan  Restor  Total  world 
Passenaer cars on the road  1970  S3 770  88 209  8 041  38180  188 000 
(millions)  197S  702S8  lOS 987  16683  60672  2S3 600 
1980  86 S34  120104  23 6SS  86 892  317 ISS 
o/o chanae 
1970-80  +60·9  +36·1  +194·1  + 127·00  +68·7 
Car ownenhip (number  1970  214  431  77  12  Sl 
of  cars per I 000  197S  272  496  149  17  63 
inhabitants)  1980  332  S40  202  23  79 
o/o chanae 
1970-80  +SS·l  +25·2  + 162·3  +91·6  +S4·9 
Reaistrations  1970  6 7Sl  8 388  2 379  4 S82  22  100 
( 000)  197S  6964  8 262  2 738  774S  2S 709 
1980  8 S3S  8 801  2 886  10528  30750 
o/ochanae 
1970-80  +26·4  +4·9  +21·3  +129·8  +39·1 
Production  1970  9424  6 sso  3 179  3 S47  22 700 
( 000)  197S  8 328  6 717  4 S68  S787  2S 400 
1980  9 S4S  7 000  7 oso  7 ISS  307SO 
o/o chanae 
1970-80  +1·3  +6·9  + 121·7  +101·7  +3S·4 
Exports  1970  2 4S8  28S  726  I 307  4776 
( 000)  1975  2 oso  640  I 827  I 808  6325 
1980  1898  69S  3820  2 034  8447 
o/o chanae 
1970-80  -22·8  + 148·2  +426·2  +SS·6  +76·9 
Imports  1970  149  2 007 1  18  2 27S  4449 
( 000)  1975  599  2 071  42  3 414  6132 
1980  I 362  2 830  47  4203  8442 
o/ochanae 
1970-80  +810·0  +41·0  +161·1  +84·7  +89·8 
S0111U:  Marketins Systems. 
1  I  ncludina imporu rrom Canada. 
S.2/81 Annex2 
Value of lmporta/exporta of Japan end the Community 
Passenger cars  (milliOit USDI 
1970  197~  1978  1979  1980 
Total imports of 
Community  I 246·5  3 621·9  5 004·8 
Japan  54·1  236·9  412·6  575·0 
Total exports of 
Community  3 668·0  6 628·8  10337·1  II 839·5 
Japan  903·4  4030  10617  11964 
Commercial vehicles 
1970  197S  1978  1979  1980 
Total importl of 
Community  204·7  546·6  798·7 
Japan  7·0  12·8  24·0 
Total exports of 
Community  980·3  3 703· 7  3438·7  4091·3 
Japan  402·5  2 039·6  5 019·4  4 563·6 
Spare parts 
1970  1975  1978  1979  1980 
Total imports of 
Community  571·6  I 181·8  I 594·3 
Japan  45·5  89·9  93·7 
Total exports of 
Community  1389·8  3 806·3  5 381·9  7 284·2 
Japan  124·6  637·6  1613·0  I 737·4 
Passenger cars, commercial vehicles and spare parts 
1970  197~  1978  1979  1980 
Total imports of 
Community  2 022·8  5 350·3  7 397·8 
Japan  289·4  515·3  697·7 
Total exporu of 
Community  6038·1  14138·8  19157·7  23 215·0 
Japan  1430·5  6 707·2  17 249·4  18 265·0 
S.2/81  55 Annex3 
Geographical breakdown of Japanese exports of passenger cera 
1970  1979  1980 
Destination 
Volume 
"' 
Volume 
"' 
Volume 
"' 
)(  ( 000)  )(  ( 000)  )(  (000) 
North America  404·5  55·1  1648·4  53 ·I  1986·7  52·0 
of which:  United States  339·5  46·8  I 587·5  51·2  I 850·0  48·4 
Community (Nine)  44·6  6·1  630·2  20·3  743·4  19·5 
of which:  FR of  Germany  0·4  0·1  175·9  5·1  211·0  S·S 
France  1·5  0·2  47·6  I· 5  54·8  1·4 
Italy  0·4  0·1  1·6  0·1  0·3  -
Netherlands  15·2  2·1  94·1  3·0  117·0  3·1 
Belgium/Luxem-
bourg  17·0  2·3  81·3  2·6  105·6  2·8 
United Kingdom  S·O  0·7  175·7  5·1  201·1  5·3 
Ireland  - - 27·0  0·9  28·1  0·7 
Denmark  5·1  0·7  27·0  0·9  25·5  0·7 
Rest of  Western Europe  56·5  1·8  179·6  5·8  217·0  5·1 
of which:  Greece  3·8  O·S  15·7  O·S  10·7  0·3 
Nine + Greece  48·4  6·7  645·9  20·8  754·1  19·7 
Asia  63·9  8·8  345·1  11·1  485·1  12·7 
of which:  Middle East  1·1  1·1  149·2  4·8  209·9  S·S 
Saudi Arabia  1·3  0·2  100·2  3·2  130·3  3·4 
Australia tf: New Zealand  86·3  11·9  149·5  4·8  165·0  4·3 
Africa  39·6  5·4  72-3  2·3  117 ·5  3·1 
Latin America  29·8  4·1  72·4  2·3  104·1  2·7 
Eastern Europe  0·4  0·1  4·5  0·1  2·0  0·1 
World  125·6  100·0  3 102·0  100·0  3 820·8  100·0 
SDtlrr•:  Market ina Systems. 
S.2/81 Annex4 
Estimated US production capacity of newly-designed fuel-efficient cera, 
1980-85 
(ill mU/1011 WlliU) 
1980:  Chrysler: 
General Motors:  Omni/Horizon  300 
Chevette  400  K-body  900 
X-body  800  Total  1200 
Total  l 200  Volkswaaen: Rabbit  450 
Chrysler: Omni/Horizon  300  Total, 1983  7 210 
Volkswaaen: Rabbit  250 
Total, 1980  I 750  1984: 
General Motors: 
1981:  Chevette  400 
General Motors:  X-body  860 
Chevette  400  J-body  900 
X-body  860  Intermediate/  standard  3 000 
J-body  450  Total  5 160 
Total  I 710  -
Ford: Escort/Lynx  485  Ford: 
Escort/Lynx  I 200 
Chrysler:  Compact/intermediate  1100 
Omni!Horizon  300  Standard  1000 
K-body  525  Total  3 300 
Total  825  ==-
Volkswaaen: Rabbit  250  Chrysler:  - Omni/Horizon  300 
Total, 1981  3 270  K-body  900 
1982:  Total  I 200 
General Moton:  Volkswaaen: Rabbit  450 
Chevctte  400  Total, 1984  10110  X-body  860 
J-body  500  1985: 
A-body  400  General Moton: 
Total  2160  Chevette  400 
Ford: Escort/Lynx  600  X-body  860 
J-body  900 
Chrysler:  Intermediate/standard  4000 
Omni/Horizon  300  Total  6160 
K-body  700 
Total  I 000  Ford: 
Volkswaaen: Rabbit  250  Escort/Lynx  1200 
Compact/intermediate  1100 
Total, 1982  4010  Standard  1000 
1983:  Total  ....u!!2 
General Moton: 
Chrysler:  Chevctte  400  Omni/Horizon  300  X-body  860  K-body  900  J-body  500 
Intermediate/standard  2 500  Total  I 200 
Total  4260  Volkswaaen: Rabbit  450 
-= 
Ford: Escort/Lynx, compact/intermediate  I 300  Total, 1985  II 110 
N011:  All data baled upon estimates made by US Depanment of Tranaponation and public information available throuah trade mapzinea. 
S.2/8l  57 Annex5 
Foreign aourclng - Recently announced commitments by US automobile 
manufacturers to purchase foreign-made components for use In domestic 
vehicles production 
Automobile  Desc:riplion or  Intended  Manuracturina  Approximate 
number or  Period  manuracturer  component  UIC  source  components 
GM  2·81it V-6  Cars  GM Mexico  < 400 000/year  1982-
2·01it L-4  Mini trucks  lsuzu (Japan)  100 000/year  1981-
with transmis-
sion 
I · 8 lit diesel L-4  Chevette  lsuzu (Japan)  small numbers  1982-
I· Slit L-4  J-car  GM Brazil  2SO 000/year  1979-
THM 180  Chevette  OM Strasbourg  - 2SO 000/year  1979-
automatic  (France) 
transmission 
Ford  2·21it L-4  Cars  Ford Mexico  < 400 000/year  1983-
Diesel L-4  Cars  Toyo Kogyo  I  SO 000/year  1983-
2 ·0 lit L-4  Mini trucks  Toyo Kogyo  < 100 000/year  1982-
2· 31it L-4  Cars  Ford Brazil  -SO 000/year  1979-
Diesel6cyl.  Cars  BMW/Steyr  100 000/year  1983-
Turbo-diesel/  Cars  BMW/Steyr  - 198S-
4cyl. 
Manual trans- Front disc cars  ToyoKogyo  100 000/year  1980-
axles 
Aluminum cyl- 1·61it L-4  Europe, Mexico  - 1980-
inderheads 
Electronic  Cars  Toshiba  100 000+ /year  1978-
enaine 
control devices 
Ball joints  Cars  Musashi  I 000 000/year  1980-84 
Seimibu 
Chrysler  L-6and V-8  Can  Chrysler  < 100 000/year  early 1970' 
enaines  Mexico 
2·21it L-4  K-body  Chrysler  < 270 000/year  1981 
Mexico 
2 ·6lit L-4  K-body  Mitsubishi  I million  1981-8S 
I· 71it L-4  L-body (Omni)  Volltswaaen  1·2 million  1978-82 
1·6lit L-4  L-body  Talbot  400 000 total  1982-84 
(Peuaeot) 
2 · 0 lit Diesel  K-body  Peuaeot  100 000/year  1982-
V-6 
1·41it L-4  A-body  Mitsubishi  300 000/year  1984-
(Omni replace-
mcnt) 
Aluminum cyl- 2·21it L-4  Fiat 
inderheads 
AMC  Car components  AMC-Renault  Renault in  300 000/year  1982-
and power train  France 
and Mexico 
VW of  America  Radiators,  Rabbit  VWMexico  2SO 000/year  1979-
stampinas 
L-4 diesel and  Cars  VWMexico  300 000+ /year  1982-
aas 
S-1: Automotive  News.  Ward's  Enaine  Update.  Ward's  Automotive  Repon.  American  Metal  Markel,  Delroil  Free  Press.  and Japan  Economic 
Journal. 
S.2/81 Annex6 
Eatlmeted hourly compenaetlon of production workers In the motor 
vehicle end equipment lnduatrtea, 1975-80 
USD 
8 
6 
4 
2 
Germany (FR) 
us 
Canada 
France 
Italy 
UK 
Japan 
Mexico 
L  .... ----------------· •---- Brazil 
L--------------------------·  S. Korea 
0~------r------r------~----~------~--------
191S  1976  1977  1978  1919  1980 
s-:  Bureuu or LMbor Slulillits. Orrice or Productivily and TechnoiOI)'. November 1910. 
Nm•:  1"4Mjor  MUiombile-produ~inl c:orporalions pay hi1her waps •nd hence •how hi1her c:orporalt averap labor COlis 1han lhe above, which includes 
m•ny •mall rirm•. 
S.2/81  59 Annex 7 
Employment In the European motor vehlclelndu•try, 1974·79 
1974 
Germany (FR)  634·1 
France  414·8 
United Kingdom  497·8 
Italy  253·7 
Belgium  50·7 
Luxembourg  0·6 
Ireland  1·6 
Denmark  4·8 
Netherlands  22·8 
Community  I 886·9 
St~t~lff: Eurostat- Workers in industry, NACE 35. 
Fisures in,lude both assembly and spare pans manufacture. 
60 
1975 
591·5 
446·7 
478·3 
242·5 
46·4 
0·7 
7·2 
4·0 
21·8 
I 839·1 
1976  1977  1978 
589·7  619·5  646·9 
463·7  486·1  487 
444·1  474·1  486·7 
240·4  230·6  228·3 
SO·S  S2·S  54·6 
0·8  0·8  0·8 
7·0  7·0  6·2 
3·9  4·3  4·4 
21·4  22·4  22·7 
I 821·5  1897·3  1936·2 
( {)()()) 
1979 
672·8 
489·3 
471·6 
56 
6·1 
24·1 
1953·4 
S.2/81 AnnexB 
Qeogrephlcel breakdown of Community export• of punnger  cera 
1970  1979  1910 
Destination 
Volume  'Ito  Volume  'Ito  Volume  'Ito  ( 000)  ( 000)  ( 000) 
We.rtem Europe  6S9·0  26·8  803·1  38·4  733·4  38·6 
or  which:  Greece  21·4  0·9  4S·O  2·2  37·2  2·0 
Eastern Europe  80·9  3·3  80·1  3·8  63·4  3·3 
North America  993·9  40·4  S34·3  2S·S  SOI·O  26·4 
or  which:  United States  861·S  3S·3  428·9  20·S  441·6  23·2 
Latin America  162·S  6·6  131·4  6·3  108·S  S·1 
A  .ria  IS4·6  6·3  217·7  10·4  226·8  11·9 
or  which:  Middle East  69·2  2·8  82·2  3·9  139·0  7·3 
Japan  12·2  O·S  39·1  1·9  31·S  1·7 
Africa  2S8·9  IO·S  2S3·S  12·1  221·0  11·6 
Oceania  123·3  S·O  S1·2  2·7  29·1  1·6 
Other  24·8  1·0  14·8  0·7  IS·O  0·8 
World Total  24S7·9  100·0  2092·1  100·0  I 898·8  100·0 
Intra-Community 1xport.f  2 272·6  - 2999·S  - 2 692·8  -
S.2/81  61 Annex9 
Japan••• penetration of the Community market 
o/o of motor vehicle market 
1980 
D  0·1  0·1  0·4  J.J  1·3  1·7  1·9  2·4  3·7  5·6  10·3 
F  0·2  0·2  0·4  0·7  0·8  1·5  2·7  2·6  1·8  2·2  3·1 
0·02  0·1  0·1  0·1  0·04  0·1  0·2  0· I  0·1  0·1  0·1 
UK  0·4  1·0  2·9  5·5  6·7  9·0  9·4  10·6  10·9  10·8  11·9 
8/L  5·0  7·0  10·0  12·0  13·0  16·5  18·0  19·3  17·8  17·7  24·6 
NL  3·2  6·7  9·5  11·4  11·6  15·6  16·8  19·8  18·8  19·5  26·2 
DK  0·4  4·3  9·6  6·6  10·7  16·1  19·0  17·4  18·0  14·4  29·5 
IRL  0  0  0·9  5·3  4·9  11·6  12·7  19·7  23·9  26·7  30·5 
GR  14·6  13·5  13·3  8·7  8·9  10·8  15·1  19·1  13·8  34·2 1  42 1 
Total: EEC  0·6  1·0  2·0  3·0  3·4  4·8  5·4  7·0  6·3  6·9  8·9 
s-:  Marketina Systems. 
'  Estimate: Pauenpr can and commercial vehicles. 
62  S.2/8l Annex 10 
Development of world c•r export• 
Exportl from 
Destination  Year 
Community  Japan  USA  Othen 
Tocal 
Volume-I  'Ill  Volume I 'Ill  Volume I 'Ill  Volume I 'Ill 
( 000) 
( 000)  (000)  ( 000)  ( 000) 
1970  - - 44·6  30·1  6·4  4·3  96·9  6S·S  147·9 
Community  197S  - - 367·1  69·0  13·0  2·1  231·9  37·9  612·0 
1980  - - 743·4  S4·6  40·S  3·0  S17·0  42·4  1360·9 
Western Europe  1970  641·5  90·6  56·1  1·9  4·9  0·1  S·1  0·8  714·5 
outside  1975  687·1  80·0  118·2  13·7  6·8  0·8  47·3  S·S  8S9·4 
Community  1980  729·1  71·9  210·6  20·8  13·S  1·3  60·9  6·0  I 014·6 
Africa  1970  104·3  8S·8  16·S  13·6  0·1  0·1  0·6  O·S  121·S 
includina Niaeria  197S  94·4  11·1  IS·6  12·8  0·2  0·2  3·S  3·1  114·0 
and South Africa  1980  82·3  48·2  71·3  41·7  2·S  I·S  14·8  8·7  170·9 
1970  74·6  17·2  8·8  9·1  4·S  4·7  8·7  9·0  96·6 
MiddleEut  197S  194·3  62·3  S9·1  19·2  38·S  12·4  19·0  6·1  311·7 
1980  141·8  31·4  21S·I  47·6  S0·9  11·3  43·8  9·1  4SI·S 
Far East  1970  10·1  S8·4  4l·S  34·3  S·1  4·7  3·1  2·6  121·0 
excludins South 
Korea  197S  60·3  37·0  70·9  43·9  IS·I  9·3  15·2  9·4  161·S 
and Taiwan  1980  S9·0  19·5  212·S  70·2  14·0  4·6  17·2  S·1  302·6 
Oceania  1970  119·9  S1·4  61·1  32·4  1·0  0·5  20·3  9·1  208·9 
Australia and  1975  80·1  28·2  ISS ·I  66·3  0·1  - 13·6  S·5  278·9 
New Zealand  1980  2S·6  12·4  15S·2  1S·O  0·4  0·2  2S·1  12·4  206·9 
North America  1970  993·9  67·8  404·5  21·6  - - 61·5  4·6  1466·9 
USA and Canada  197S  621·9  41·9  801·8  S3·5  - - 68·9  4·6  1497·8 
. 1980  SOI·O  21·4  I 986· 7  1S·8  - - 73·4  2·8  2 S61·1 
South America  1970  39·8  64·9  10·3  16·8  S·O  8·2  6·2  10·1  61·3 
excludina Brazil,  1975  26·6  42·8  24·2  38·9  4·3  6·9  7·1  11·4  62·2 
Afaentina,  1980  40·S  30·4  60·7  43·6  12·9  9·1  19·0  14·3  133·2 
Mexico, Venezuela 
s-:  Marketina Systems. 
S.2/81  63 Annex 11 
Trend  of  research  end  development  expenditure  expressed  as  percen-
tage of gross domestic product 
3·0 
% 
2·0 
1·0 
1964  1965  1967  1969  1971  1973  1975  1977 
Sotm:~: Commission of the European Communities. analysis of the research and development potentials of the Member States of the European Com· 
munities. 
64  S.2/8l Annex 12s 
Annu•l c.r u1e tu  burden 
(Petrol taxes, vehic:les taxes + I  0 'MI of purchue taxes for ei1ht European c:ara runnin1 IS 000 km a year) 
/11  rw~lt•mu (ratio of  taxes to avera1e wa1ea, not inc:ludin1 social c:ontributiona) 
o/o 
so 
45 
JS 
30 
25 
20 
IS 
10 
s 
Vehidea  A  8  c  D  E  F 
S.2/81 
G  H 
65 Annex 12b 
Summary of taxes and prices of premium petrol, diesel fuel and LPG 
(end-February 1980) 
(EUA/100/(A, B.  C.  O)IHI(E. F) 
B  DK  D  f  I  L  NL  IRL  UK 
A.  Excise 
Premium petrol  20·99  23·56  17·72  25·05  29·91  17·26  19·13  20·77  12·54 
Diesel fuel  6·94  3·88  16·80  13·13  2·16  4·96  6·76  12·78  14·23 
LPG  6·82  3·88  12·89  7·14  17·51  2·23  0  9·83  6·26 
B.  VAT 
Premium petrol  7·51  9·58  5·32  8·78  6·04  2·04  7·89  4·52  5·76 
Diesel fuel  4·98  5·44  5·32  5·68  2·67  1·24  5·15  3·69  5·59 
LPG  4·74  4·53  3·83  5·09  4·65  1·12  3·14  2·88  3·73 
c.  Total tax 
Premium petrol  28·50  33·14  23·04  33·83  35·95  19·34  27·02  25·29  18·30 
Diesel fuel  11·92  9·32  22·12  18·81  4·83  6·20  11·91  16·47  19·82 
LPG  It  ·56  8·41  16·72  12·23  22·16  3·35  3·14  12·71  9·99 
D.  Selling price 
Premium petrol  54· 57  56·96  46·33  58·00  56·50  43·41  51·52  49·80  43·71 
Diesel fuel  36·18  32·49  46·33  38·20  25·01  25·79  33·62  40·66  43·04 
LPG  34·37  27·05  33·44  34·07  38·12  23·28  20·38  31·78  28·80 
E.  Selling price 
(relative) 
Premium petrol  100  100  100  100  100  too  100  100  100 
Diesel fuel  66  57  100  66  44  59  65  82  98 
LPG  63  44  72  59  67  54  40  64  66 
F.  Exci.se(retative) 
Premium petrol  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Diesel fuel  33  16  95  52  7  29  35  62  113 
LPG  32  16  73  29  59  13  0  47  50 
66  S.2/81 ~  Annex 13  ....., 
' 
00 
Motor vehicles directives 
No  Referenllt  Council/ 
Commission 
I.  70/1561  Council 
Council 
2.  70/1571  Council 
3.  70/2201  Council 
4.  70/221 1  Council 
5.  70/2221  Council 
6.  70/31 )I  Council 
7.  70/3871  Council 
8.  70/3881  Council 
9.  71/1271  Council 
10.  711320t  Council 
II.  72/245  Council 
Title 
Type-approval of  motor vehicles and their trailers 
Resolution regarding EEC whole vehicle type-approval for 
passenser cars 
Permissible sound level and exhaust system of  motor vehicles 
Measures to be taken qainst air pollution by gases from 
positive-ignition engines of  motor vehicles 
- Corrigendum 
Liquid fuel tanks and rear protective devices for motor vehicles 
and their trailers 
- Corrigendum (FR. EN, IT, NL, DA) 
Space for mounting and fixing of  rear registration plates on 
motor vehicles and their trailers 
Steering equipment for motor vehicles and their trailers 
- Corrigendum 
Doors of  motor vehicles and their trailers 
Audible warning devices for motor vehicles 
- Corrigendum 
Rear-view mirrors of  motor vehicles 
Braking devices of  certain categories of  motor vehicles and of 
their trailers 
Suppression of  radio interference produced by spark-ignition 
enpnes fitted to motor vehicles 
'--- --
01 
1  Treaty of Accession (Denmark. Ireland. United Kin ..  om). adopced on 22.  I. 1972, OJ L 13.  23. 3. 1972 .  ..... 
Date of  No and pase  Date of 
adoplion  of OJ  OJ 
6.2.1970  L42/l  23.2.1970 
29.6.1977  c 177/1  26. 7. 1977 
6.2.1970  L42/16  23.2.1970 
20.3.1970  L 76/1  6. 4. 1970 
L81/15  II. 4. 1970 
20.3.1970  L 76/23  6.4.1970 
L65/42  15.3.1979 
20.3.1970  L 76/25  6. 4. 1970 
8.6.1970  L 133/10  18.6.1970 
L 196/14  3. 9. 1970 
27. 7. 1970  L 176/5  10.8.1970 
27. 7.  1970  L 176/12  10. 8. 1970 
L 176/72  21. 6. 1974 
I. 3.  1971  L68/l  22. 3. 1971 
26. 7.  1971  L202/37  6. 9.  1971 
20.6.1972  L 152/15  6. 7. 1972 ~  Annex 13 (continued) 
!1.1 
""  ...... 
00 
No 
12. 
13. 
14. 
IS. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
Reference 
72/306 
73/350 
74/60 
74/61 
74/132 
74/290 
74/297 
74/408 
74/483 
75/443 
--
Council/ 
Commission 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
--
Tille 
Measures to be taken apinst  the emission of  pollutants from 
diesel enaines for use in vehicles 
- Corrigendum (FR, EN, IT, NL, DA) 
- Corrigendum (FR, EN) 
Adaptation to technical progress of  the Council Directive 
101 I 57 /EEC of  6. 2. 1970 relating to the permissible sound level 
and the exhaust system of  motor vehicles 
Interior fittings of  motor vehicles (interior parts of  the passenger 
compartment other than the interior rear-view mirrors, layout or 
the controls, the roof or slidiq roof, the backrest and rear part of 
the seats) 
- Corrigendum (FR, EN, NL, IT, DA) 
Devices to prevent the unauthorized use of  motor vehicles 
- Corrigendum (FR, EN, NL, IT, DA) 
Adaptation to technical progress of  the Council Directive 
71 /320/EEC of  26. 7. 1971 relatins to the braking devices of 
certain categories or motor vehicles and or  their trailers 
Adapting to technical propess Council Directive 70/220/EEC 
of  20. 3. 1970 relating to measures to be taken apinst air 
pollution by pses from positive-ignition enaines of  motor 
vebides 
Interior fittings of  motor vehicles (the behaviour of  the steering 
mechanism in the event of an impact) 
Interior fittings of  motor vehicles (strength of  seats and of  their 
anchorqes) 
External projections of  motor vehicles 
Reverse and speedometer equipment of  motor vehicles 
- Corrisendum 
--·-- - - ----
Due or  Noandpqe  Date or 
...,.ion  or OJ  OJ 
2. 8. 1972  L 190/1  20.8.1972 
L21S/20  6.8.1974 
L297127  23. II. 1977 
7.  I I. 1973  L 321/33  22.  II. 1973 
17.  12. 1973  L38/2  II. 2. 1974 
L21S/20  6.8.1974 
17.  12. 1973  L38/22  II. 2.  1974 
L21S/20  6. 8. 1974 
II. 2. 1974  L 7417  19.3.1974 
28.5.1974  L 159/61  15.6.1974 
4.6.1974  L 165/16  20.6.1974 
22. 7. 1974  L221/l  12.8.1974 
17 .•. ,.,.  I  ~,..~.  2. 10.1974 
26. 6. 1975  L 196/1  26. 7. 1975 
L296/19  IS.  II. 1975 
- ---·  ---------·  -··-!"l  ...., 
' 
00 
s 
No 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
Reference  Council/ 
Cotnmission 
751524  Commission 
76/114  Council 
76/115  Council 
161156  Council 
761757  Council 
761758  Council 
161759  Council 
76176{)  Council 
761761  Council 
761762  Council 
77/102  Commission 
77/212  Council 
77/389  Council 
Title 
2nd Adaptation to technical propess of  the Council Directive 
71 /320/EEC of  26. 7. 1971 relating to the braking devices of 
certain cate,ories of  motor vehicles and of  theU- trailen 
Statutory plates and insaiptions for motor vehicles and their 
trailers, and their location and method of  attachment 
Anchorages for motor vehicles safety belts 
Installation oflightinaand light-sipallina devices on motor 
vehicles and their trailers 
Reflex reOedors for motor vehicles and their trailers 
End-outline marker lamps, front position (side) lamps, rear 
position (side) lamps and stop lamps for motor vehicles and their 
trailers 
Diredion indicator lamps for motor vehicles and their trailers 
Rear rqistration plate lamps for motor vehicles and their trailers 
Motor vehicle headlamps which function as main-beam and/or 
dipped-beam headlamps and incandescent electric filament 
lamps for such headlamps 
Front fog lamps for motor vehicles and filament lamps for such 
lamps 
Adaptation to technical proaress oftbe Council Directive 
70/220/EEC of  20. 3. 1970 relating to measures to be taken 
apinst air pollution by gases from positive-ipition enpnes of 
motor vehicles 
Amendment to Directive 70/  I 57 /EEC of  6. 2. 1970 on the 
permissible aound level and exhaust system of  motor vehicles 
Motor vehicle towing-devices 
Date of  Noandpoae  Dote of 
adoption  of OJ  OJ 
25. 7. 1975  L236/3  8.9.1975 
18. 12. 1975  L24/l  30. I. 1976 
18. 12. 1975  L24/6  30. I. 1976 
27. 7. 1976  L 262/l  27.9.1976 
27. 7. 1976  L262/32  27.9.1976 
27. 7. 1976  L262/54  27.9.1976 
27. 7. 1976  L262/71  27.9.1976 
27. 7. 1976  L262/85  27.9.1976 
27. 7. 1976  L262/96  27. 9. 1976 
27. 7. 1976  L262/122  27.9.1976 
30. II. 1976  L32/32  3.2.1977 
8.3.1977  L66/33  12.3.1917 
17. 5. 1977  L 145/41  13. 6. 1917 ~  Annex 13 (continued) 
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'  00 
No 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
RerCftnce 
77/538 
171539 
77/540 
77/!541 
77/649 
78/315 
78/316 
78/317 
78/318 
78/507 
78/547 
78/!548 
78/!549 
Council/ 
C0011m_.,n 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Title 
Rear foalamps for motor vehicles and their trailers 
- Corrigendum (FR, DE, EN, NL, IT, DA) 
ReversinJ lamps for motor vehicles and their trailers 
- Corriaendum (FR, DE, EN, NL, IT, DA) 
Parkinalamps for motor vehicles 
- Corrlaendum (FR, DE, EN, NL, IT, DA) 
Safety belts and restraint systems of  motor vehicles 
Field of  vision of  motor vehicle drivers 
- Corriaendum (FR, DE, EN, IT, NL, DA) 
- Corriacndum (Fll, DE, DA, IT, NL) 
Amendment to Directive 70/  I S6/EEC of  6. 2. 1970 on 
type-approval of  motor  vehicles and their trailers 
Interior fittinp of  motor vehicles (identification of  controls, 
tell-tales and indicators) 
Defrostina and demistina systems of  alazed surfaces of  motor 
vehicles 
Windsaeen-wiper and windsaeen washer systems of  motor 
vehicles 
Adaptation to technical prosress of  the Council Directive 
76/114/EEC of 18. 12. 1975 re1atinato statutory plates and 
insaiptions for motor vehicles and their trailers, and their 
location and method of  attachment 
Amendment to Directive 70/156/EEC of6. 2.  1970 on 
type-approval of  motor vehicles and their trailers 
Heating systems for the passenaer compartment of  motor 
vehicles 
Wheel pards of  motor vehicles 
o.aeor  No:,-r  D.lcor 
Mop!  ion  OJ 
28.6.1977  L220/60  29. 8. 1977 
L284/11  10. 10. 1978 
28.6.1977  L220172  29.8.1977 
L284/ll  10.10. 1978 
28.6.1977  L220/83  29. 8. 1977 
L284/12  10. 10.1978 
28.6.1977  L220/95  29. 8. 1977 
27.9.1977  L26711  19. 10. 1977 
L IS0/6  6.6.1978 
L284/ll  10. 10. 1978 
21. 12. 1977  LSI/I  28.3.1978 
21. 12. 1977  L81/3  28.3.1978 
21. 12. 1977  LSI/27  28.3.1978 
21. 12. 1977  L81/49  28.3.1978 
19.5.1978  L 155/31  13.6.1978 
12.6.1978  L 168/39  26.6.1978 
12.6.1978  L 168/40  26.6.1978 
12. 6. 1978  L 168/45  26.6.1978 !"'J 
N 
'  00 
-1  -
No 
48. 
49. 
so. 
Sl. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
ss. 
56. 
Refe~nce  Council/ 
Commiaion 
78/632  Commission 
78/665  Commission 
78/932  Council 
79/488  Commission 
191489  Commission 
79/490  Commission 
791795  Commission 
80/233  Commission 
801710  Council 
Tille 
Adaptation to technical prolfCSS of  the Council Directive 
74/60/EEC of 17. 12. 1973 relatina to interior flttinp of  motor 
vehicles (interior parts of  the paiiCiliCI" compartment otba" than 
the interior rear-view mirrors, layout of  the controls, the roof  or 
slidina roof, the backrest and rear part of  the seats) 
Adaptation to technical proaress of  the Council Directive 
70/220/EEC of  20. 3. 1970 relating to measures to be taken 
aaainst air pollution by pses from positive-ipition engines of 
motor vehicles 
Head restraints of  seats of  motor vehicles 
Adaptation to technical proaress of  the Council Directive 
74/483/EEC of 17. 9. 1974 relating to external projections of 
motor vehicles 
3rd adaptation to technical progress of  the Council Directive 
711320/EEC of  26. 7. 1971 relatina to the braking devices of 
certain catqories of  motor vehicles and their trailers 
- Coni,endum 
Adaptation to technical propas of  the Council Directive 
70/221 /EEC of  20. 3. 1970 relating to the liquid fuel tanks and 
rear undenun protection of  motor vehicles and their trailers 
Adaptation to technical propas of  the Council Directive 
71/127/EEC of I. 3. 1971 relatina to the rear-view mirrors of 
motm vehicles 
Adaptation to technical propas of  the Council Directive 
76/7S6/EEC of  27. 7. 1976 relatiq  to the installation of  the 
liptiq  and J.iaht-sipallina devices on motor vehicles and their 
trail  en 
- ConiFOdum (FR, DE, EN, IT, NL, DA) 
Rear-view mirrors for two-wheeled motor vehicles with or 
without a side-c:ar and to their fittina on such vehicles 
Dole of  No and.,...  Dale of 
adoplion  of OJ  OJ 
19.5.1978  L206/26  29. 7.  1978 
14. 7.  1978  L223/48  14.8.1978 
16. 10.1978  L325/l  20. II. 1978 
18.4.1979  L 128/1  26.5.1979 
18.4.1979  L 128/12  26.5.1979 
L 146/35  14.6.1979 
18.4.1979  L 128/22  26.5.1979 
20. 7. 1979  L239/l  22.9.1979 
21. II. 1979  LSI/8  25.2.1980 
L 111/22  30.4.1980 
22. 7. 1980  L229/49  30.8.1980 ;j  Annex 13 (continued) 
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57. 
58. 
59. 
Refcrcnct-
80/1268 
80/1269 
80/1267 
Council/ 
Commis.,ion 
Council 
Council 
Council 
I 
Title  Date of  No and page  D-•te of 
adoption  of OJ  OJ 
I 
Fuel consumption of motor vehicles  16.  12. 1980  L375/36  31. 12. 1980 
Engine power of  motor vehicles  16.  12. 1980  L 375/46  31. 12. 1980 
Amendment to Directive 70/  156/EEC relating to the type-
approval of  motor vehicles and their trailers  16.  12. 1980  L 375/34  31.  12. 1980 Annex 14 
Europeen Soclel Fund - Beneficiaries In the automobile end components 
sector 
R•ion  TechniRI  Groups orfirms  proareu 
Beneficiaries  EUAIECU  Beneliciaries  EUAIECU  Bentficiaries  EUAIECU 
1978  - - - - - -
1979  - - - - - -
1980  s  000  6 203 000  I 000  1200000  - -
198JI  2 000  I 482 000  240  149000  I 000  1900000 
1  The fiaures for  1981  are incomplete as the Commission has nol yet decided arants of the second inslalment for 1981. 
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